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Abstract
This thesis consists of three empirical chapters studying the relationship be-
tween religion and political economy for a sample of countries with substantial
Muslim presence.
Chapter one is a study of the relationship between religiously motivated at-
titudes and FDI for a panel of predominantly Muslim countries over a period of
ten years stretching from 1997 to 2006. Instrumenting for the attitude variables,
I find that countries with more progressive attitudes towards women and higher
levels of openness towards foreigners tend to be more attractive to FDI.
Chapter two examines the relationship between Islam and economic growth for
a panel of countries with substantial Muslim presence over the period 1990-2008.
Using instrumental variables, I show that higher levels of religiosity, measured by
belief and attendance, depress economic growth.
Following up on the findings of chapters two and three, in chapter three I inves-
tigate how different patterns of religious behaviour map onto economically relevant
attitudes for a sample of individuals from predominantly Muslim countries. The
empirical findings suggest that religiosity in predominantly Muslim countries is
associated with conservative attitudes towards women, and intolerance towards
strangers. On the other hand, religiosity is found to be associated with confidence
in state institutions, the respect of law, and pro-market attitudes. Testing for the
influence of September 11 on religiosity, I find that Muslims after 2001 are more
religious.
In this thesis I find that religion negatively influences FDI by encouraging
conservative attitudes towards women and intolerance towards foreigners. These
attitudes are also plausible channels through which the negative influence of reli-
gion on economic growth works. I also find that the pro-market attitudes produced
by religion are another plausible channel through which the negative influence of
religion works. Finally, the increase in religiosity after the September 11 attacks,
ceteris paribus, could plausibly mean that the negative influence of religiosity in
countries with substantial Muslim presence on economic performance would in-
crease.
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Introduction
Growing evidence suggests that religion affects economic outcomes by influencing
individual attitudes and behaviour. Empirical studies have shown that religion,
measured by religious beliefs and attendance, has an influence on a variety of do-
mains of economic activity such as international trade, foreign direct investment
(FDI), and economic growth.
For example, studying the influence of religion on economic growth for a sample
of predominantly Christian countries, Barro and McCleary (2003) and McCleary
and Barro (2006) find that religiosity, measured by beliefs and attendance, has
an influence on economic growth. Trust, which is believed to be influenced by
religion, is found to have an impact on institutions–the fundamental cause of eco-
nomic growth (Acemoglu et al., 2005). Putnam (1993) and La Porta et al. (1997)
argue that hierarchical religions such as Catholicism and Islam tend to be associ-
ated with low levels of trust. La Porta et al. (1997) find that countries with low
levels of trust tend to have “less efficient judiciaries, greater corruption, lower-
quality bureaucracies, higher rates of tax evasion, lower rates of participation in
civic activities and professional associations, a lower level of importance of large
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firms in the economy, inferior infrastructures, and higher inflation.”1 Using data
for a sample of European countries, Guiso et al. (2009) show that countries with
high levels of bilateral trust tend to trade more and have higher levels of bilateral
foreign investment.
Like trust, individualism, uncertainty avoidance, and power distance are val-
ues that are plausibly influenced by religious beliefs. For example, Vandello and
Cohen (1999) argue that the prevalence of strong religious traditions in the US
South “surely” encourages collectivism. Using a measure of openness developed
by Quinn (1997), de Jong et al. (2006) find that the degree of openness of an econ-
omy depends on the values that the society holds. In particular, societies with
high levels of individualism tend to be associated with high levels of openness.
However, uncertainty avoidance and power distance (i.e. unequal distribution of
power) are negatively associated with openness.
However, the published empirical literature on the relationship between reli-
gion and economic performance has typically considered samples of predominantly
Christian countries. Moreover, these studies have consistently pointed at the nega-
tive influence of Islamic beliefs on economic outcomes. Hence, the natural question
that follows is whether the findings of the literature with respect to the influence of
religiosity in Islam on economic performance hold for samples with larger Muslim
representation.
The present dissertation is an attempt to contribute to the growing debate on
1La Porta et al. (1997), p. 337-38.
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the relationship between religion and political economy with a focus on countries
with substantial Muslim presence. This thesis consists of three empirical chapters.
Chapter one is a study of the influence of religiously motivated attitudes on FDI.
In chapter two I study the impact of religiosity on economic growth. Chapter three
investigates the relationship between aspects of religious behaviour and attitudes
believed to influence economic outcomes.
In chapter one I investigate the relationship between religiously motivated at-
titudes and FDI for a panel of predominantly Muslim countries. The central
perspective of the chapter is that religion, by influencing individual attitudes and
views, affects FDI performance. The World Values Survey (WVS) is a mega
database offering data on attitudes towards a variety of issues including religion.
Unfortunately, data is available only for a limited number of predominantly Mus-
lim countries. To get around this issue, two measures of attitudes believed to be
influenced by religion are constructed using data from the World Bank database:
external cultural openness and internal openness. The former, derived as the ratio
of the number of incoming tourists to total population, is a measure of tolerance
towards foreigners. Hence, a higher ratio means a higher degree of external cul-
tural openness. The latter variable, equal to the share of seats taken by women
in parliament, is a measure of the extent to which a society embraces progressive
and liberal attitudes towards women. The two variables are found to be signifi-
cantly associated with religiosity. In particular, more religious commitment tends
to map onto more conservatism and less tolerance towards others. Using instru-
mental variables for the openness variables, I find that predominantly Muslim
societies with higher degrees of external and internal openness tend to be more
12
attractive to foreign direct investors.
Exploiting data on religious behaviour from the WVS for a panel of countries
with substantial Muslim presence, chapter two studies the influence of religiosity
on economic growth, measured by the growth rate of real GDP per capita. The
religiosity variables, robust across religions, are measures of whether the individual
is religious, belief in the importance of religion in life, belief in the importance of
God in life, and attending formal religious services. These religiosity variables are
strongly correlated with the attitude variables employed in the FDI chapter. In
particular, more religious commitment tends to be associated with more negative
attitudes towards women and foreigners. To deal with the potential endogene-
ity problem, I use instruments for the belief and attendance variables in order to
isolate the sense of causation from religiosity to economic growth. The empirical
results suggest that higher levels of religious beliefs and attendance are deleterious
to economic growth. Consistent with the findings of the FDI chapter, the negative
association between religiosity and economic growth suggests that higher levels of
religious attendance and belief produce the type of attitudes that negatively influ-
ence economic growth. In this sense, the negative attitudes towards women and
intolerance towards strangers are plausible channels through which the negative
influence of religion on growth works.
The empirical evidence of the FDI and the growth chapters suggest that reli-
gious behaviour in countries with substantial Muslim presence varies across coun-
tries. Moreover, there are indications that different patterns of religious behaviour
are associated with different economically meaningful attitudes.
13
Following up on these findings, the concluding chapter of this dissertation ex-
amines how individual religious behaviour maps onto attitudes that are believed
to have an influence on economic outcomes. Making use of the WVS dataset, I
select seventeen dependent variables measuring economically relevant attitudes.
These variables, gathered in six groups, are measures of attitudes about the role
of women in society, trusting others, confidence in state institutions, the respect of
legal regulations, the market, and tolerance towards immigrants and individuals
from different cultural backgrounds. The dependent variables are regressed on four
measures of religiosity found to have a significant influence on economic perfor-
mance in the growth chapter. These variables are the belief in the importance of
God in life, the belief in the importance of religion in life, and attending religious
services. I also consider a measure of whether the individual is an atheist. The
regression analysis is performed on a sample of individuals from Sunni-majority
countries and replicated for a sample of individuals from Shi’ite-majority countries.
In the final chapter of the thesis, I also examine the influence of the September
11 2001 terrorist attacks (henceforth September 11) on religiosity for Muslims.
September 11 is a major event that had, and still have, serious repercussions for
Muslims around the world. Ever since the attacks, Islam has been associated with
terrorism and even fascism. In retaliation Muslims are reportedly more religious.
The findings of chapter three suggest that in both the Sunni-majority and
the Shi’ite-majority countries religiosity tends to foster conservative attitudes to-
wards women, and intolerance towards immigrants and individuals from different
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cultural backgrounds. On the other hand, religiosity is found to be associated with
confidence in state institutions and the respect of legal regulations. Furthermore,
in contrast with the findings of Guiso et al. (2003), religiosity in Muslim-majority
countries is associated with pro-market attitudes. With respect to the impact of
the event of September 11 on religiosity, I find that Muslims are more religious
after 2001.
The conservative attitudes towards women and the intolerant attitudes towards
foreigners found to be associated with religiosity in chapter three, are consistent
with the findings of the FDI and the growth chapters. In the FDI chapter I found
that the negative attitudes towards women and intolerance towards strangers map
onto poor FDI performance. These negative attitudes are also plausible channels
through which the negative influence of religion on economic growth works. In
predominantly Muslim countries, religion plays a major role in shaping individual
attitudes towards women and non-Muslims. The dominant Islamic doctrine por-
trays the woman as a weak being, constantly in need for assistance, and, hence,
her role in society has to be limited to what suits her “nature.” With respect
to non-Muslims, while some verses of the Qur’an and passages of the H. adit. talk
positively about non-Muslims, some others address non-Muslims in a remarkably
negative tone. Non-Muslims are described as “infidels,” and Muslims are encour-
aged to dissociate themselves from them. The findings of the thesis suggest that
the negative attitudes towards non-Muslims are dominating.
Another possible channel through which the deleterious effect of religion on
growth works is the “excessive enthusiasm” for the market. The mainstream
15
economic theory advocates the superiority of the market institution in driving
economic prosperity. However, the experience of the late-industrializing countries
suggest that a higher degree of state intervention is desirable. Studying the late-
industrialization of South Korea, Amsden (1992) argues that “when late indus-
trialization arrives, the driving force behind it is a strong interventionist state.”1
Similarly, Chew and Lee (1991) find that the state in Singapore played a central
role in the industrialization of the economy.
Given the negative influence of religion on economic performance suggested
by the findings of the FDI and the growth chapters, the increase in religiosity
caused by September 11, ceteris paribus, could plausibly mean that countries
with substantial Muslim presence would become even less attractive to FDI, and
their performance in economic growth would worsen.
1Amsden (1992), p. 55.
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Chapter 1
Religiously Motivated Attitudes
and FDI
1.1 Introduction
Previous research on the determinants of FDI has isolated a number of variables
that are central to understanding why certain countries are more attractive to
foreign investors than others. There is a consensus among researchers that sound
economic fundamentals and good-quality institutions are crucial in attracting FDI.
The influence of cultural factors on FDI is, by and large, an area of research
that remains unexplored. This chapter investigates the influence of religiously-
motivated attitudes on FDI in predominantly Muslim countries.
In a fairly recent study, Dolansky and Alon (2008) examine the influence of
religion on Japanese decision to invest overseas. The authors find that religious
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diversity has a positive influence on Japanese investment decisions. Studying the
influence of trust on FDI for a sample of European countries, Guiso et al. (2009)
find that higher levels of bilateral trust tend to be associated with higher levels of
bilateral FDI. Although trust per se is not a religious attitude, the findings of the
literature suggest that religion has an influence on trust. Putnam (1993) argues
that by discouraging horizontal bonds among individuals, hierarchical religions
discourage the formation of trust. In agreement with Putnam (1993), La Porta
et al. (1997) find that trust tends to be low in countries with hierarchical religions,
such as Catholicism and Islam.
Although La Porta et al. (1997) describe Islam as hierarchical they do not
explain how it is so. It is likely that the authors reach their conclusion by analogy.
That is if Catholicism, which is overtly hierarchical (Putnam, 1993), encourages
distrust, then Islam which is also negatively associated with trust must also be a
hierarchical religion. Although the hierarchical nature of Catholicism is clear and
manifested through the Vatican and other institutions, the hierarchy within Islam
is less obvious and, hence, a clarification is in order.
According to Islamic beliefs Islam has five pillars and Muslims are required
to observe them. In order to perform the rituals associated with these pillars
believers do no need approvals from formal authorities. For example Muslims
need no approvals to observe the month of Ramadan.1 A reading of the Qur’an
suggests that in Islam the relationship between the Muslim and the Deity is di-
rect and there are no intermediaries. However, over the centuries Islam became
1Verse 2:185 of the Qur’an reads “whoever sights [the new moon of] the month, let him fast
it; and whoever is ill or on a journey then an equal number of other days.”
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hierarchical in the sense that a class of clergies emerged (Tarabishi, 2010). The
main occupation of the clergy is to provide interpretations of the scriptures that
legitimize the monarch’s rule and provide individuals with answers and solutions
to daily problems. To this day the role of Muslim clerics is central in shaping be-
lievers’ attitudes towards a variety of issues including attitudes towards the role of
women in society and non-Muslims. Take for example Khomeini’s fatwa´1 against
Salman Rushdi. According to the fatwa´ Rushdi should be killed for his “heretic”
Satanic Verses, and whoever carries out the sentence will be heavenly rewarded.
By his fatwa´, Khomeini as a cleric is “interfering” with God’s will. Yet the Qur’an
clearly states that reward and punishment is in the hand of God and no person
can interfere with God’s will.2
Compared to other parts of the world, the performance of predominantly Mus-
lim countries in attracting FDI is relatively poor. For example, according to the
figures of UNCTAD, the stock of FDI per capita of all Arab countries–a predom-
inantly Muslim area, combined, stood at $1,370 in 2008. This is less than the
world average, and about 90 percent less than the Euro Area level.3 Can reli-
giously motivated attitudes explain the poor FDI performance of predominantly
Muslim countries?
The WVS is a database that covers individual attitudes in 87 countries and
1A fatwa´ (Arabic for verdict or legal judgment) is a legal ruling related to issues involving
religion.
2For example, verse 14 of chapter 48 of the Qur’an reads: “[...] To God belongs the dominion
of the heavens and the earth. He forgives whom He wills and punishes whom He wills. And ever
is God forgiving and merciful.”
3My own calculations based on the statistics of the UNCTAD database available online at
http://unctadstat.unctad.org.
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territories on a variety of issues, including religion. The data can be aggregated at
the country level and used in macro-studies. Unfortunately, predominantly Mus-
lim countries are still under-represented, and there is a lack of data for the sample
of countries used in this study. To get around this issue and study the channels
through which religion influences FDI in predominantly Muslim countries, two
variables measuring the degree of progressiveness of the society and its openness
to outsiders are constructed using data from the World Bank database. The first
variable is a measure of tolerance towards foreigners, and shall be called external
cultural openness. This variable is obtained by dividing the number of incoming
tourists by the total population. A higher ratio implies a higher degree of external
cultural openness. The second variable is a measure of attitudes towards women.
This variable can be thought of as a measure of internal openness, that is openness
within the same society, and it is equal to the share of seats taken by women in the
parliament. The two variables are found to be strongly associated with religios-
ity. In particular, more religious involvement, measured by attendance and belief,
tends to be associated with more conservatism and less openness to outsiders. The
two variables are discussed in more detail in section 1.3 below.
The relationship between religiosity and economic performance is believed to
run both ways. If religion by affecting the degree of openness of the society might
have an influence on FDI, it is reasonable to hypothesize that more FDI, by in-
creasing society’s exposure to other cultures leads to less religious intolerance and
conservatism, and hence to more external and internal openness. To deal with the
potential problem of endogeneity, instrumental variables are used to pin down the
sense of causation from religiously-motivated attitudes to FDI performance.
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The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 1.2 provides
a review of two studies relevant to the present chapter. Section 1.3 introduces
the variables and describes the data used in the empirical analysis. Section 1.4
presents and discusses the results. Section 1.5 concludes the chapter.
1.2 Review of the Relevant Literature
Schneider and Frey (1985) argue that the decision of a multinational firm to invest
overseas depends on expected higher profitability in the host economy compared
to at home, and on political factors. Hence, the study of the determinants of FDI
should be based on a model that takes into account both economic and political
factors. According to Schneider and Frey (1985), this model, labelled the politico-
economic model of FDI, should include four groups of variables: three of economic
nature and one of political nature. The economic variables are measures of the
internal and external economic conditions in the host economy, along with mea-
sures of the advantages offered by the labour market (e.g. skills). The political
determinants should include variables reflecting the political situation of the host
country such as an index of political instability. It is worth noting that given the
world political context, Schneider and Frey (1985) suggest as a political variable
the amount of aid received from the Soviet block.
Schneider and Frey (1985) estimate four different specifications and find that
the model that includes both economic and political variables gives better results.
The empirical results suggest that countries with good economic fundamentals
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and enjoying political stability tend to be more attractive to FDI (Schneider and
Frey, 1985).
The findings of Schneider and Frey (1985) are confirmed by other researchers.
For example, in a recent review of the literature on the determinants of FDI, Bloni-
gen (2005) documents that economic factors such as the exchange rate, trade, and
the rate of tax have an influence on FDI decisions. Klein and Rosengren (1994)
find that the depreciation of the exchange rate positively influences FDI in the
United States. Similarly, Kiyota and Urata (2004) find that a depreciation of
the host country exchange rate has a negative influence on Japanese investments
overseas. The authors also find that high exchange rate volatility negatively in-
fluences Japanese investments overseas (Kiyota and Urata, 2004). Using a panel
of eleven OECD countries over a period of 15 years, from 1984 to 2000, and four
measures of corporate tax rates, Be´nassy-Que´re´ et al. (2005) find that taxation
has a significantly negative influence on FDI decisions.
With respect to political and institutional factors, Blonigen (2005) argues that
factors such as political stability, legal protection, and expropriation risk influence
FDI decisions. Low quality institutions increase the cost of doing business (Bloni-
gen, 2005). These factors, according to Blonigen (2005), are of major importance
in particular for developing countries. Examining the impact of corruption on
FDI, Wei (2000) finds that countries with high levels of corruption are less attrac-
tive to FDI.
Recently the literature on the determinants of FDI has taken new directions.
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The role of cultural factors is gaining increasing attention. One important dimen-
sion of culture is religion. In two recent studies, the authors examine the influence
of religion and religiously-motivated attitudes on FDI. Dolansky and Alon (2008)
exploit data on Japanese FDI to study the influence of religious tolerance in host
countries on Japanese firms’ decisions to invest. In their study Guiso et al. (2009)
use data on bilateral FDI for a sample of European countries to study the influence
of trust on FDI. Although trust in itself is not a religious attitude, the findings of
the literature (Putnam, 1993; La Porta et al., 1997) suggest that it is influenced
by religion.
In what follows I review the studies of Dolansky and Alon (2008) and Guiso
et al. (2009). To avoid unnecessary repetition, a discussion of the limitations of
the papers is provided at the end of the review.
1.2.1 Dolansky and Alon (2008)
In their study, Religious Freedom, Religious Diversity, and Japanese Foreign Direct
Investment, Dolansky and his colleague examine the question of whether religious
freedom in host countries influences Japanese investments decisions.
To address their research question, Dolansky and Alon (2008) formulate three
testable hypotheses about the relationship between religion and FDI. Hypothe-
sis 1—religious freedom has a positive influence on FDI; hypothesis 2—the exis-
tence of a state religion negatively influences FDI; hypothesis 3—religiously diverse
countries are more attractive to foreign direct investors.
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For the first hypothesis the authors argue that societies enjoying higher levels
of religious freedom are more attractive to FDI because investors feel safer, and
their property rights and other economically relevant rights are less likely to be
jeopardized (Dolansky and Alon, 2008). The second hypothesis rests on the idea
that countries with state religions are more likely to be intolerant towards other
religions. Hence, these countries are likely to be less tolerant towards foreign in-
vestors who are of different religions. To support their argument, Dolansky and
Alon (2008) report a negative and statistically significant correlation between the
existence of a state religion and a measure of religious pluralism. With respect to
the third hypothesis, Dolansky and Alon (2008) argue that “Barro and McCleary
(2003) conclude that greater diversity leads to greater economic growth. Because
FDI is a key component of economic growth (Drabek and Payne, 2001), it follows
that religious diversity should stimulate FDI.”1 This hypothesis finds support in
the positive correlation that Dolansky and Alon (2008) find between the index of
religious pluralism and investment.
To test for their hypotheses, Dolansky and Alon (2008) consider three religion
variables. The first variable is the Religious Pluralism Index obtained from Barro
and McCleary (2003). The second variable, Religious Freedom Score, is a measure
of the extent to which a society enjoys religious freedom. The data are obtained
from Marshall (2000), and the score ranges between 1 and 7, with 1 referring to
a religiously free country, and 7 referring to the lack of religious freedom. The
third religion variable used in the empirical analysis is a dummy for the existence
of state religion. This variable is obtained from the tabulations of Barrett et al.
1Dolansky and Alon (2008), p. 35.
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(2001). The dummy takes the value 1 if the country has a de facto state religion,
0 otherwise. In addition to the explanatory religion variables, Dolansky and Alon
(2008) employ two more variables as controls: GNP and cultural distance. Cul-
tural distance is a measure of cultural dissimilarities between countries (Hofstede,
1980; Kogut and Singh, 1988).
The dependent variable used by the authors is the number of investments made
by Japanese firms in each country. After dropping China, an outlier, and Latvia
and Lithuania, because there are no recorded Japanese investments in these coun-
tries, Dolansky and Alon (2008) end up with a sample of 54 countries.
The FDI data used by Dolansky and Alon (2008) cover the period 1986–2001
and they are obtained from the database constructed by the company Tokyo
Keizai. According to the information provided by the company on its website,
Tokyo Keizai Inc. specializes in the publication of business-related materials and
offers database services. The database offers data on overseas investments for a
number of public and private Japanese companies.
The empirical analysis of Dolansky and Alon (2008) consists of two stages.
The authors perform a multivariate analysis of covariance (MANCOVA), then a
regression analysis. The empirical findings are reproduced in Table (1.1) below.
Expectedly, the results of the multivariate analysis suggest a significant influence
of GNP. Furthermore, religious pluralism is positively associated with Japanese
FDI. However, the measures of religious freedom, the existence of a state religion,
and an interaction term between the two variables are insignificant. The findings
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of the MANCOVA analysis suggest that Japanese investors are more likely to be
attracted by countries with large economies and higher levels of religious diversity.
Table 1.1: Dolansky and Alon (2008)—Religion and Japanese FDI
MANCOVA Regression analysis
Estimated Estimated Estimated
F-statistic coefficient coefficient
(1) (2) (3)
Intercept 2.88* 144.434* -143.779
(0.097) (0.089) (0.203)
GNP 106.95** 0.834** 0.767**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Religious pluralism 13.08** 1173.959**
(0.001) (0.001)
Religious freedom 1.22
(0.276)
State religion 0.03
(0.968)
Religious freedom×state religion 0.31
(0.736)
R2 0.796 0.72 0.78
Notes: The p-values reported in parentheses. The symbols ** and * mean that
the coefficient is statistically significant at the 1 and 10 percent level, respec-
tively.
In the regression analysis, the authors use the religion variable that is found
to have a significant influence on FDI in the MANCOVA analysis. A measure
of cultural distance from Japan was also considered, but because it proved to be
insignificant in a stepwise procedure it is dropped from the regression (Dolansky
and Alon, 2008). Columns (2) and (3) of Table (1.1) reproduce the results of the
regression.
Expectedly, the empirical findings show that GNP is positively associated with
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FDI, and it explains 72 percent of the variation in Japanese investments overseas.
Including the index of religious pluralism in the regression increases the overall
explanatory power of the model to 0.78 (from 0.72). According to the results
of the regression, after controlling for market size, religious pluralism explains
6% of the variation in Japanese FDI. Although Dolansky and Alon (2008) fail
to demonstrate any significant influence of the existence of a state religion and
religious freedom on FDI, they find evidence of a significantly positive influence
of religious diversity on Japanese FDI. This impact, however, is small compared
to the influence of the market size gauged by GNP.
As to why the variable state religion has an insignificant influence on FDI,
Dolansky and Alon (2008) argue that this might be due to a measurement error.
Alternatively, the authors argue that the existence of a state religion does not
necessarily mean that the state is repressive of other religious expressions. For
example, Scandinavian countries enjoy a relatively high level of religious freedom
despite the existence of state religion. China, on the other hand, is a country with
no state religion but tends to be repressive of religious expressions (Dolansky and
Alon, 2008).
1.2.2 Guiso et al. (2009)
Although trust per se is not a religious attitude, it has been shown that it is influ-
enced by religion. Putnam (1993) concludes that religion in Italy is hierarchical
because it encourages the “vertical bond” of authority over “horizontal bonds”
with other individuals. La Porta et al. (1997) find that hierarchical religions such
as Catholicism, Orthodox Christianity, and Islam tend to be associated with low
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levels of trust. Studying the relationship between religion and trust for a sample
of American individuals, Guiso et al. (2006) find that different religious denomi-
nations and different degrees of religious involvement map onto different levels of
trust. In particular, while trust is positively associated with being a Protestant, it
is negatively associated with being a Hindu. Moreover, attending religious services
is found to increase trust (Guiso et al., 2006).
The study of Guiso et al. (2009) examines the influence of trust on FDI for a
sample of country members of the European Economic Area (EEA). Data on trust
are obtained from the Eurobarometer Survey where samples of individuals from
the various countries are asked about the degree to which they trust individuals
from the different country members, including fellow citizens. Each participant is
asked whether she or he has (1) no trust at all, (2) not very much trust, (3) some
trust, or (4) a lot of trust.
Guiso et al. (2009) exploit these data on bilateral trust to see whether the ex-
tent to which the people of country i trust people of country j affects country i FDI
decisions in country j. The dependent variable is FDI originating from country i
in each of the other countries of the EEA. Other controls include press coverage,
common language, and a dummy for shared borders.
Trust can be thought to have a two-way interaction with FDI. With trust con-
sidered as an independent variable, more trust leads to more FDI. However, with
trust regarded as a dependent variable, one could hypothesize that more FDI, by
increasing society’s exposure to other cultures, leads to a higher level of trust.
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In order to deal with the potential problem of endogeneity, Guiso et al. (2009)
use instrumental variables to isolate the direction of causation from trust to FDI.
The instruments are religious similarities and somatic distance. The somatic dis-
tance is a measure of how ethnically and genetically far apart two nations are, and
it is constructed by using data on height, the colour of the hair, and the cephalic
index (i.e. a measure of the size of the skull).
According to the results of the IV regression reported by Guiso et al. (2009),
trust has a positive influence on FDI. Specifically, for a given pair of countries, a
high level of trust between their peoples leads to a high level of bilateral FDI. Fur-
thermore, having similar legal regulations and press coverage stimulate bilateral
FDI. Expectedly, distance has a significantly negative impact on FDI. Surprisingly
the results of the regression show that sharing the same language and having lin-
guistic common roots are negatively associated with FDI. An interesting result
is the positive influence of the transportation cost on FDI. Guiso et al. (2009)
rationalize this result by appealing to the argument that transportation costs “act
as a barrier to trade, which might induce direct investment as a substitute to
export.”1 It is worth noting that in an GLS exercise, Guiso and his colleagues
find that transportation cost is negatively associated with FDI, suggesting that a
higher cost leads to less bilateral FDI.
Finally it is noteworthy that Guiso et al. (2009) do not use measures of eco-
nomic fundamentals in their study. Classic candidate variables such as market size,
1Guiso et al. (2009), p. 1123.
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the degree of integration into the world economy, and infrastructure are absent.
1.2.3 Summary of the Review
Dolansky and Alon (2008) study the influence of religion on the decision of Japanese
firms to invest overseas. The authors find that religious diversity in host countries
is positively associated with Japanese decisions to invest overseas. Exploiting data
for a sample of EEA countries, Guiso et al. (2009) find that countries with high
levels of bilateral trust tend to have high levels of bilateral FDI. The two studies,
however, have some limitations. The purpose of this subsection is to highlight
them.
One major problem with Dolansky and Alon (2008) is that the authors do
not use instrumental variables in order to isolate the direction of causation from
religion to FDI. A second issue is the choice of the explanatory variables. With
respect to the religion variables, it is straightforward to notice the strong relation-
ship between religious pluralism, religious freedom, and the existence of a state
religion. The overlap between the three variables raises the question about the
extent to which the three variables are picking up different aspects of religion.
Also, Dolansky and Alon (2008) do not include measures of religious belief and
attendance to control for religious commitment in society. Religious pluralism
does not necessarily mean religious tolerance. A religiously diverse society might
score highly in the pluralism index and be subject to religion-driven tensions.
In their regression analysis, Dolansky and Alon (2008) consider only GNP as a
control variable. Schneider and Frey (1985) and Blonigen (2005) stress the impor-
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tance of including other explanatory variables measuring the internal and external
performance of the host country, its political stance, and the quality of its institu-
tions. The failure to include additional controls raises the question as to whether
the religion variables are picking up some indirect influence of economic variables
left out of the equation.
The same critique applies to Guiso et al. (2009). The right hand side variables
used in the regression do not include variables that are typically used in similar
studies.
The paper of Dolansky and Alon (2008) studies the relationship between reli-
gion and Japanese investments overseas. On the other hand, the paper of Guiso
et al. (2009) studies the relationship between trust and FDI for a sample of EEA
countries. Hence, the question that arises is whether these findings can be gener-
alized to other parts of the world, and how religiosity and religiously motivated
attitudes other than trust and religious diversity influence FDI.
The aim of the present chapter is to make a contribution to the growing liter-
ature on the influence of religion on FDI by addressing the limitations underlying
the papers reviewed above. Specifically, this chapter investigates the influence of
religiously-driven attitudes on FDI for a panel of predominantly Muslim countries.
Two variables measuring attitudes are considered: internal openness and external
cultural openness. These variables gauge the extent to which the people of a given
country have progressive views about the role of women in society, and the degree
of openness to outsiders. The following section discusses these variables in more
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detail.
1.3 Explanatory Variables and Data
In Muslim-majority countries attitudes about women and attitudes about strangers
are heavily influenced by religion. The WVS is a mega-dataset offering data on
variables measuring attitudes towards a variety of issues including attitudes to-
wards the role of women in society and attitudes towards strangers. However, for
the sample of countries I am employing in this chapter, data are available only for
some countries. Given the lack of data, two variables measuring attitudes towards
foreigners and women are constructed using the World Bank dataset. The first
variable is derived as the ratio of international tourists to total population, and
shall be called external cultural openness. The second variable is the share of
seats taken by women in national parliaments, and shall be called internal open-
ness (i.e. openness within the same society). These two variables are discussed
in more detail below, along with the economic and political controls used in the
regression.
1.3.1 Internal and External Cultural Openness
The WVS database offers data on religiosity for about 87 countries and territo-
ries. However, only few of the countries of my sample are covered. The World
Bank database, although it covers variables not of religious nature, offers data on
two variables that are strongly associated with religion. The first is the share of
seats taken by women in the parliament. This variable gauges the extent to which
women can assume “non traditional” responsibilities in society. The World Bank
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database also offers data on the number of incoming tourists. This variable is
weighed by the total population of the country, and it is intended as a measure of
the extent to which a society is open to outsiders.
The pattern shown by the data reported in Table (1.2) suggests that less reli-
gious commitment tends to be associated with more progressive attitudes towards
women and more tolerance towards immigrants. The data on these attitudes are
obtained from the WVS dataset and are the closest to the attitude variables used
in the present chapter, namely internal openness (i.e. share of women in par-
liament) and external cultural openness (i.e. ratio of incoming tourists to total
population). The total number of observations ranges between 41,036 and 46,720
and they are relative to individuals from countries that have more than 50 percent
of the population adhering to Islam.
In predominantly Muslim societies, the extent to which women participate in
public affairs and the degree of openness to non-Muslims are heavily influenced
by religion. The Qur’an, the founding text of Islam, and the body of H. adit., a
compilation of the acts and the sayings of Mohamed, the Prophet of Islam, are
full of verses and passages that are interpreted by influential clerics in ways that
encourage negative attitudes towards the role of women in society and intolerance
towards non-Muslims. By these interpretations the ideal role of the woman is
to be a housewife. With respect to non-Muslims, often described as “infidels,”
Muslims are advised to dissociate themselves from them.
Influential Muslim clerics have created and maintained a situation whereby
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many Muslims believe that holding these negative attitudes towards women and
non-Muslims is part of the “correct” understanding of Islam.
Internal openness. The extent to which women participate in politics is an
important indicator, if not the most important, on the prevalence of liberal and
progressive views in predominantly Muslim countries. Women and their rights are
still an issue of debate between conservatives and progressives. Based on a series
of Qur’anic verses and H. adit.s, conservatives are for a limited role of women in so-
ciety. For example, addressing women, verse 33:33 of the Qur’an reads: “abide in
your houses and do not display yourselves as [was] the display of the former times
of ignorance [that is in the pre-Islamic era].”1 This verse along with others are
interpreted and understood in ways to promote the “ideal” woman as a housewife
whose role is limited to raising children, cooking, and running the house affairs. In
a widely circulated book (eleven editions in less than six years), Bakr Abu Zayd,
a Saudi Muslim cleric, argues that given the differences between women and men,
the former are made to work inside the house and the latter are made to work
outside (Abu Zayd, 2005). According to Abu Zayd, campaigners for women rights
in Saudi Arabia and other Muslim-majority countries are part of a conspiracy
orchestrated by the “West” to deviate Muslims from their faith.
On the other hand, the progressive opinion, based on the universal values of
human rights and secular ideologies, is in favour of more rights for women. In this
sense, the increase of women’s political participation is an indicator of the extent
to which a society is moving away from religious conservatism towards embracing
1The Qur’an (2010), chapter 33 verse 33.
35
more progressive and liberal attitudes. This pattern is reflected by the correlations
reported in Table (1.2): less religiosity is associated with more progressive views
towards women.
The variable internal openness equals the share of seats taken by women in
legislative bodies. This variable is expected to have a positive impact on FDI. In
other words, countries enjoying higher degrees of internal openness will be more
attractive to foreign investors.
External cultural openness. The attitudes a population has towards foreigners,
who might be from different religious and cultural backgrounds, might influence
the decision of foreign investors to invest. In this sense, countries with hostile
attitudes towards strangers are expected to be less attractive to foreign investors.
Several texts and passages in the Islamic scriptures are understood in a way
that encourages Muslims to dissociate themselves from non-Muslims and to think
of them as inferior erring beings.1 In some predominantly Muslim countries the
government plays a role in the dissemination of such views. For example, backed
with an ultra-conservative Wahabi ideology, the ruling family in Saudi Arabia
invests in encouraging intolerant and negative views towards non-Muslims. For
example, a middle school textbook published by the Saudi ministry of education
explains that imitating Jews, Christians,2 and “infidels” is harmful to Islam–the
1For Wahabism, an extremely literalistic interpretation of Islam that emerged in the 18th
century in present-day Saudi Arabia, the category non-Muslims is broad enough to include Shi’ite
Muslims.
2Masih. iyun is the way to refer to Christians in Arabic. However, some fundamentalist Mus-
lim clerics refer to Christians as Salibiyun, a derogatory term which means “Cross-worshippers.”
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only and exclusive way to salvation. In Egypt, where about 10 percent of the
population is Christian, Wajdi Ghoneim, a popular Egyptian tele-Islamist, ex-
pressed his joy about the death of Pope Shenouda III. Ghoneim described the late
Shenouda as the head of heresy and proclaimed that Egypt was relieved by his
death.
The variable external cultural openness, which is a measure of the degree of
a country’s openness to the outside world, is equal to the ratio of international
tourists to the total population of the host country. This variable is expected to
have a positive influence on FDI, that is, more open societies are more attractive
to foreign investors.
Islam emerged in the Arabian Peninsula in a population of Arabs and then
spread out into other territories. Hence, it is possible that some aspects of Arab
culture are misattributed to Islam. In order to disentangle the influence of being
Muslim from that of being Arab, a dummy variable, Arab, is considered. The
dummy takes the value 1 if the country is an Arab country, 0 otherwise. I also
consider the Muslim share of the population in the regression.
1.3.2 Economic and Political Controls
Gross domestic product. GDP is a classic economic candidate variable. It proxies
for the market size. Empirical evidence reveals a positive association between the
size of the economy and FDI. Hence, the sign of the coefficient on GDP is expected
to be positive, suggesting that foreign investors are attracted by larger markets.
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Government consumption. Government consumption refers to the ratio of gov-
ernment consumption to GDP. The ratio is intended as a measure of the involve-
ment of the government in the economy. Hence, the larger the ratio of governments
consumption to GDP the lesser are the opportunities for the private sector. How-
ever, it is equally plausible to hypothesize that the relationship between FDI and
government consumption is positive. This is possible when the government does
not compete with foreign investors, and rather invests in sectors complementary
to FDI.
Trade openness. The popular indicator of trade openness used in the litera-
ture is the share of trade (imports + exports) to GDP. Nevertheless, this measure
of openness is somewhat crude because it might be picking up the country size
rather than economic potential. Frankel and Rose (2002) find that physically large
countries tend to trade less. Following Barro (2001) the trade ratio used in this
chapter is filtered for the estimated relation of this ratio to land area (in log) and
population (in log).
The sign of the coefficient associated with trade openness depends on the type
of FDI. Asiedu (2002) argues that in the case of market-seeking investments (hor-
izontal FDI), foreign investors will prefer higher barriers to entry to keep the com-
petition outside the market. Conversely, for reasons related to transaction costs,
export-seeking FDI (vertical FDI) will favour economies with low trade barriers
and tariffs. On the other hand, Chakrabarti (2001) argues that a high degree of in-
tegration into the world economy is more likely to have a positive influence on FDI.
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Infrastructure. UNCTAD (2002) argues that a proper measure of infrastruc-
ture should include roads and railway networks, along with telephone infrastruc-
ture. The availability of these facilities is important for foreign investors to coor-
dinate production activity within country and across countries. The inclusion of
these variables also captures the cost of transportation (UNCTAD, 2002). Unfor-
tunately, because of massive lack of data on roads and railways for many countries,
I only consider the number of telephone lines per 100 people, a standard practice
in the literature. Countries with good infrastructure are expected to be more at-
tractive to foreign investors.
Oil and gas. The extraction of oil and gas is an export-oriented activity. This
activity will attract vertical FDI. In this sense, one might hypothesize a positive
relationship between the oil/gas industry and FDI. However, Asiedu and Lien
(2011) hypothesize a negative relationship between natural resources and FDI.
The authors argue that “[w]hile natural resource exploration requires a large ini-
tial capital outlay, the continuing operations demand a small cash flow. Thus, after
the initial phase, FDI may be staggered.”1 In their empirical analysis, Asiedu and
Lien (2011) find a strong negative association between natural resources and FDI.
In order to test for the influence of natural resources on FDI, a dummy variable,
oil/gas exporter, is generated. Any country with fuel exports making 20 percent
or more of its total exports of merchandise is considered as an oil/gas exporting
country. The oil/gas share of exports is computed as an average of the available
data for each country over the sample period. It is not possible to consider the
1Asiedu and Lien (2011), p. 104.
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actual ratio of fuel exports to total exports because of the massive gaps in the data.
Health. Human capital is controlled for by considering a measure of health
condition. The variable is obtained as the average of the percentage of children
aged 12 to 23 months immunized against DPT1 and measles. A higher share of
children vaccinated against communicable diseases means healthier and more pro-
ductive workers. Alsan et al. (2004) argue that health has a direct effect on labour
productivity: sick workers tend to be frailer and have higher rates of absenteeism.
In their empirical analysis, Alsan et al. (2004) find that health has a significant
influence on FDI.
Democracy index. As the literature indicates, political factors are as important
as economic factors in influencing foreign investors’ decision to invest. Evidence
suggests that political stability and good-quality institutions have a positive influ-
ence on FDI (Wei, 2000; Blonigen, 2005). The study of Busse and Hefeker (2007)
finds that countries enjoying the rule of law and having low levels of corruption
are more attractive to foreign investors. To control for institutions, I consider an
index of democracy. The existence of a functioning democracy is an indicator of
political stability.
Table (1.3) provides a summary statistics of the variables used in the regression
analysis. The figures are relative to the year 2006. The differences between the
minimum and the maximum figures for all variables are significant, and suggests
large disparities between the countries of the sample. For example, in 2006 the
1DPT stands for Diphtheria, Pertussis, and Tetanus.
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highest stock of FDI per capita recorded was in Bahrain and stood at 10,659.80
dollars. However, the lowest was 11.62 dollars in Niger. With respect to GDP, the
level figures (not reported in the table) show that Turkey’s GDP is 1,330 times
higher than Comoros’s GDP. The trade ratio suggests that some countries are more
integrated into international trade than others. According to the figures reported
in Table (1.3) in 2006 Malaysia had the highest trade ratio, more than 200 percent,
while Pakistan’s trade ratio was the lowest and stood at 38 percent. According
to the reported figures, the average share of women in parliament for the sample
Table 1.3: Summary Statistics of Variables, Year 2006
Variable Obs. Mean S.D. Min Max
Stock of FDI per capita 38 1,406.38 2,617.51 11.62 10,659.80
Log of real GDP 38 23.68 1.84 19.78 26.98
Government consumption 38 13.31 4.99 4.94 27.96
Trade ratio 38 84.81 34.54 38.45 202.58
Infrastructure 38 9.99 8.96 0.20 32.06
Health 38 84.20 15.49 40.00 99.00
Oil/gas exporter 33 39.06 38.71 0.05 96.95
Democracy index 38 2.55 3.24 0 9
Internal openness 36 9.29 6.72 0.00 22.80
External openness 35 39.13 128.98 0.13 767.65
Muslim share 38 85.93 12.99 53.10 100.00
Arab country 38 0.50 0.51 0 1
Notes: Stock of FDI per capita is expressed in real US dollars. Government
consumption and Trade ratio are expressed as shares of GDP. Health is the
average share of infants aged 12 to 23 months immunized against four com-
municable diseases, namely DPT and measles. Oil/gas exporter is measured
by the share of oil and gas exports of total merchandise exports. Internal
openness and External openness are, relatively, the share of seats taken by
women in national parliaments, and the ratio of international tourists to total
population.
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was about 9 percent. The figures also show that, in 2006, while Tunisia had the
highest rate of internal openness, about 23 percent, Saudi Arabia and three other
countries had no women in their national parliaments. External openness (i.e. the
ratio of international tourists to total population) is another variable where the
difference between maximum and minimum values is considerable. According to
the figures reported in Table (1.3) Bahrain, a Gulf country, had the highest rate
of external openness in 2006 (767.65 percent), while Turkmenistan had the lowest
rate (0.13 percent). Finally, the figures reported in Table (1.3) show that half of
the sample consists of Arab countries and that the average share of the population
adhering to Islam is about 86 percent.
1.3.3 Description of the Data
Data on the variables listed above are collected for a sample of 38 predominantly
Muslim countries, that is countries in which more than 50 percent of the popula-
tion adheres to Islam. The share of the population adhering to Islam varies across
countries of the sample from 53 percent in Chad to a reported 100 percent in Mau-
ritania and Saudi Arabia. The countries are from various geographical locations.
Nineteen countries or 50 percent of the sample are Arab countries (of which 6 are
in the Arabian Peninsula). Seven countries are located in Sub Saharan Africa.
Ten Asian countries or about 24 percent of the sample. Two countries are located
in Europe. The list of countries is reported in Appendix A. Data are collected for
a sample period of 10 years stretching from 1997 to 2006. The total number of
observations is 315.
Data on the economic explanatory variables are collected from the World Bank
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database. Tajikistan has missing data for telephone lines per 100 people (i.e. in-
frastructure) in 2006. The gap is filled in with the average computed using the
observations relative to the years 2004 and 2005. The data on the stock of FDI
are collected from the UNCTAD database. The democracy index is obtained from
the Polity IV data set constructed by Marshall et al. (2010).1
The data on the share of women in parliament are obtained from the World
Bank dataset, and supplemented with data from the Inter–Parliamentary Union
database.2 For Saudi Arabia, records show that in 2004, in the recently created
non-elected senate, no women was nominated. Prior to 2004 there are no data.
Based on the fact that the participation, if any, of women in politics in Saudi
Arabia is very limited, and that if in 2004 in the newly founded senate there were
no women, then it is plausible to assume that prior to 2004 there was zero chance
for women to be nominated in this body. Thus, gaps are filled in with zeros. The
same procedure is applied to Qatar.
1.4 Results and Discussion
The dependent variable is the stock of real FDI per capita (logged) in the host
country. The motivation behind choosing stocks over flows is that the former is
much less volatile than the latter, especially in small countries where the sectors
that attract FDI are few. In addition to this advantage in working on stocks,
Be´nassy-Que´re´ et al. (2007) argue that foreign investors reason in terms of world-
wide allocation of output, and hence in terms of stock of capital. The papers of
1The database is available online at http://www.systemicpeace.org.
2The database is available online at http://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/classif-arc.htm.
43
Cheng and Kwan (2000) and Be´nassy-Que´re´ et al. (2007) are example of studies
where the authors use the stock of FDI per capita as a dependent variable.
The stock of FDI per capita is regressed on internal openness (i.e. the share
of women in the parliament) and external cultural openness (i.e. the ratio of in-
ternational tourists to total population). Other controls are also included in the
regression. As discussed above, in order to deal with the potential problem of en-
dogeneity, instrumental variables are used to pin down the sense of causation from
the openness variables to FDI performance. The instruments are the ratio of the
coastline to total borders of the country; a dummy variable equals 1 if religion is
referred to in the constitution, 0 otherwise; the distance in kilometre from Mecca,
Saudi Arabia; a measure of religious pluralism; and dummies for four geographical
locations: Europe, Sub Saharan Africa, Asia, and the Arabian Peninsula. Accord-
ing to the estimated coefficients of the first stage of the IV regression, reported in
Table (A3) in Appendix A, the instruments are very strong for external cultural
openness. However, they are less strong for internal openness. In particular, ex-
ternal openness has two instruments significant at the 1 percent level, and three
instruments significant at the 5 percent level. However, internal openness has only
one instrument, although strongly significant.
The results of the regression are reported in Table (1.4). Column (1) reports
the results of a basic model that includes measures of economic fundamentals
and an index of democracy. Column (2) reports the GLS results of the full FDI
specification that includes both measures of openness (i.e. internal and external).
Column (3) reports the results of the IV regression. Interestingly, the difference
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Table 1.4: Internal and External Openness, and FDI
GLS GLS IV
Stock of FDI per capita (logged) (1) (2) (3)
Intercept -7.015** -0.213 0.930
(2.290) (2.314) (1.955)
GDP (logged) 0.471** 0.309** 0.218*
(0.102) (0.098) (0.085)
Government consumption 0.031** 0.035** 0.052**
(0.011) (0.012) (0.018)
Trade openness 0.014** 0.016** 0.007*
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Infrastructure 0.038** 0.044** 0.062**
(0.012) (0.012) (0.018)
Health 0.012** 0.007 -0.008
(0.003) (0.004) (0.007)
Oil/gas exporter -0.228 -0.568 -0.579*
(0.411) (0.378) (0.275)
Democracy index -0.083** -0.072** -0.048*
(0.018) (0.018) (0.025)
Internal openness 0.012 0.102**
(0.006) (0.037)
External cultural openness 0.0003 0.007**
(0.001) (0.003)
Muslim share -0.038** -0.028**
(0.014) (0.010)
Arab country 1.177** 1.190**
(0.394) (0.338)
Wald χ2 229.25** 247.66** 212.08**
Number of observations 358 315 315
Number of countries 38 37 37
Notes: Columns (1) and (2): random-effects GLS regression. Col-
umn (3): G2SLS random-effects IV regression. The instrumented
variables are internal openness and external cultural openness. The
instruments are the coastline as a percentage of total borders of the
country; a dummy for the existence of a state religion; the distance
in kilometre from Mecca, Saudi Arabia; a measure of religious plural-
ism; and dummies for the three geographical locations: Sub Saharan
Africa, Asia, and the Arabian Peninsula. The standard errors re-
ported in parentheses. The symbols ** and * mean that the coefficient
is statistically significant at the 1 and 5 percent level, respectively.
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between the GLS and the IV coefficients on the attitude variables is large. For
internal openness the IV coefficient estimate is eight times higher than the GLS’s.
For external cultural openness, on the other hand, the difference is even larger.
The IV coefficient estimate is 23 times higher than the GLS coefficient estimate.
As discussed earlier, the relationship between FDI and openness (both inter-
nal and external) is a two-way interaction. The results of the Hausman test show
that the null hypothesis that the difference between the GLS estimates and the
IV estimates is not systematic is rejected. The χ2 statistic of the Hausman test,
reported in Table (A2) in Appendix A, reveals that the difference between the
IV and the GLS coefficient estimates is statistically significant. This means that
there is evidence of endogeneity and that the IV technique should be used.
Column (2) of Table (1.4) reports the results of the GLS estimation without
controlling for endogeneity. According to the results of the GLS regression, the
impact of openness on FDI is statistically not different from zero. However, after
controlling for endogeneity, the IV results reported in Column (3) of Table (1.4)
suggest that internal and external openness have a statistically significant influ-
ence on FDI.
According to the empirical findings, the economic variables, in general, have the
expected signs and are in line with previous findings of the literature. Moreover,
there is evidence that internal and external cultural openness have a significant
influence on FDI, suggesting that culture in general, and religion in particular,
matters.
46
In particular, the results of the regression reported in Column (3) suggest
that the size of the economy, measured by real GDP (in log), and the availabil-
ity of infrastructure have a statistically strong positive influence on FDI. Trade
openness is positively associated with FDI, although the estimated coefficient is
statistically insignificant. Surprisingly, government consumption has a positive co-
efficient, suggesting that countries with higher levels of government spending are
more attractive to FDI. This positive association suggests that the government
does not compete with foreign investors. Government spending, rather goes to
sectors that encourage foreign investment. Health is the average of the percentage
of children vaccinated against four communicable diseases every year. It is a mea-
sure of the health condition of the labour force. According to the results of the
estimation reported in Column (3), health does not seem to have a statistically
significant influence on FDI.
The estimated coefficient on oil/gas has a statistically negative sign. This re-
sult is in agreement with the findings of Mina (2007) and Asiedu and Lien (2011)
who find that natural resources are negatively associated with FDI. Asiedu and
Lien (2011) rationalize this negative relationship by appealing to the argument
that “[w]hile natural resource exploration requires a large initial capital outlay,
the continuing operations demand a small cash flow. Thus, after the initial phase,
FDI may be staggered.”1 However, studying FDI performance for a sample of
African countries, Asiedu (2006) finds a strong relationship between natural re-
sources, measured as the share of fuel and minerals in exports, and FDI.
1Asiedu and Lien (2011), p. 104.
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Countries with functioning democracies are less likely to experience political
instability. Thus, countries scoring highly in democracy are expected to be more
attractive to foreign investors. Surprisingly, according to the results of the regres-
sion, democracy has a statistically significant negative impact on FDI. A possible
explanation is that changes in governments, although democratic, lead to signifi-
cant changes in policies that negatively affect FDI.
Technically, it is possible that the unexpected negative sign associated with
the democracy index is related to issues involving the construction of the index.
Munck and Verkuilen (2002) provide a critique of the Polity IV indices (among
them the democracy index used in this dissertation). The authors argue that the
Polity IV indices suffer from some shortcomings related to the aggregation proce-
dure and the omission of relevant factors. For example, the eleven dimensions used
to construct the democracy index do not include a measure of participation, such
as the right to vote and the fairness of the voting process (Munck and Verkuilen,
2002).
Now we turn our attention to the variables of interest. The empirical results
suggest that religiously motivated attitudes have a significant influence on FDI
in the host country. Using instrumental variables I find that societies holding
progressive attitudes towards women and culturally open towards foreigners tend
to be more attractive to foreign investors. According to the results of the IV re-
gression reported in Column (3) of Table (1.4), an increase by 1 percentage point
in internal openness, gauged by the share of women in the parliament, ceteris
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paribus, leads to a 10 percent increase in the stock of FDI per capita. Moreover,
all other variables being held constant, an increase by 1 percentage point in ex-
ternal cultural openness, measured by the ratio of tourists to population, leads
to an increase of the stock of FDI per capita by about 1 percent. These findings
confirm my hypothesis that countries enjoying higher degrees of openness, both
internal and external, are more attractive to foreign direct investors.
According to the figures reported in Table (1.2), religious commitment tends
to be associated with conservative attitudes towards women and strangers. In
particular, individuals who believe in the importance of God and religion in life
as well as individuals self-described as religious tend to think that women are not
as good as men in politics. Also, they are inclined to dislike living next to foreign
workers. However, less religious engagement is found to be associated with more
positive attitudes towards women and tolerance towards strangers. Assuming that
the associations found between religious behaviour and belief, on the one hand,
and the attitudes, on the other hand, reflect cause-effect relationships running
from religiosity to the economically relevant attitudes, then one might argue that
there is a chain whereby religiosity influences individual attitudes towards women
and strangers, which in turn affect FDI.
In several predominantly Muslim countries, hard-line clerics dominate the re-
ligious scene. Their discourse, based on a literalistic interpretation of the Islamic
scriptures, disseminates negative attitudes towards women and encourages anti-
Muslim feelings. Women are very often portrayed as inferior beings, weak, and
constantly in need for assistance from men, obviously. With respect to non Mus-
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lims, fundamentalist clerics openly refer to them as “infidels” and encourage their
fellow believers to dissociate themselves from them. Over the years with the revo-
lutionization of mass media, influential clerics have established themselves as the
authority in religious matters.1 Hence, the mere opinion of a cleric is understood
by the majority of Muslims not as a possible interpretation of Islamic scriptures,
but as the understanding of Islam. In such circumstances the average Muslim is
lead to believe that holding negative attitudes towards non-Muslims and women
are part of the “correct” understanding of Islam.
The results of the regression reported in Table (1.4), also suggest the existence
of a residual influence of religion captured by the significant coefficient on the
Muslim share of the population. Countries with higher shares of the population
adhering to Islam are less attractive to foreign direct investors. Finally, the results
also show that, on average, Arab countries are more attractive to foreign investors
compared to the rest of the countries of the sample.
1.5 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter I examined the influence of religiously motivated attitudes on FDI
for a panel of predominantly Muslim countries over a sample period of 10 years
stretching from 1997 to 2006. Instrumenting for internal openness and external
1In an interview with Der Spiegel in 2005, Yusuf Qaradawi, an influential Muslim cleric
says: “[in Islam] we don’t have a pope; we have the Ulama, [that is] the association of scholars.”
Qaradawi adds: “[a] person can’t just call himself an imam or a mufti and hand out fatwa´s ac-
cording to whim. For this position there are clear prerequisites regarding professional experience,
academic background and character.” Qaradawi does not deny the existence of an institution
of clergies in Islam. His answers are indicating the existence of a church-like in Islam. The full
interview with Qaradawi can be found online at http://www.spiegel.de/international/spiegel-
interview-with-al-jazeera-host-yusuf-al-qaradawi-god-has-disappeared-a-376954.html
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cultural openness, respectively measuring attitudes towards women and foreign-
ers, I show that countries with higher degrees of openness are more attractive to
foreign investors. The results also suggest that countries with larger shares of the
population adhering to Islam tend to be less attractive to foreign direct investors.
Moreover, there is evidence that Arab countries, on average, outperform other
predominantly Muslim countries in attracting FDI.
The cultural external openness and internal openness are found to be strongly
associated with measures of religiosity. In particular, individuals who believe in
the importance of God and religion in life are strongly associated with negative
attitudes towards women and intolerance towards foreigners. If we were to assume
that religion produces these negative attitudes, then one might tentatively argue
that there is a chain whereby religiosity in predominantly Muslim countries affects
FDI by influencing individual attitudes towards women and strangers.
Two questions follow from the findings of this chapter. The first question is
whether the insights with respect to FDI also hold for other domains of economic
activity. In particular, the question I ask is whether differences in religious be-
haviour map onto different levels of economic growth. This question is examined
in the following chapter.
The second question follows from the pattern of correlations between religiosity
and the attitude variables. Different patterns of religious behaviour are associated
with different degrees of internal and external openness. The question, then, is
how different patterns of religious behaviour map onto other economically relevant
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attitudes. The question gains further prominence from the statistically strong neg-
ative association between the Muslim share of the population and FDI found in
this chapter. The statistically significant relationship suggests a residual influence
of religion that is not accounted for by the two measures of openness used in this
study.
To sum up, two questions immediately follow and will be taken up in the
remainder of the thesis. First, do insights with respect to the relationship be-
tween religion and FDI in predominantly Muslim countries also hold for economic
growth? Second, how different patterns of religious behaviour map onto econom-
ically relevant attitudes?
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Chapter 2
Religious Behaviour
and Economic Growth
2.1 Introduction
The debate over the determinants of economic growth has taken new directions
in recent years. Economists are increasingly interested in the role of religion in
influencing economic growth. In the recently published literature, empirical find-
ings suggest that religion has a significant influence on economic growth (Barro
and McCleary (2003); Noland (2005); McCleary and Barro (2006), for example).
However, these empirical studies have paid little attention to Islam in its con-
nection with economic growth. The purpose of this chapter is to examine the
influence of religious behaviour, gauged by belief and attendance, on economic
growth in countries with substantial Muslim presence.
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The central argument of the literature is that religion affects economic growth
by influencing individual values and attitudes. For example, a religion that encour-
ages thriftiness, honesty, and cooperation with fellow workers/citizens is expected
to have a positive impact on economic growth. In this respect, houses of worship
play a central role in fostering these attitudes and in playing the role of social
clubs were people congregate. Putnam (2000) and Sacerdote and Glaeser (2001)
argue that places of worship and temples, by fostering networks of relations be-
tween worshippers, play an important role in building social capital. This social
capital, if productive, could have a positive influence on economic performance.
Empirical evidence suggests that different systems of beliefs map onto different
levels of economic growth. La Porta et al. (1997) find that hierarchical religions,
such as Islam, are correlated with low levels of trust. Countries with low levels
of trust tend to be associated with “less efficient judiciaries, greater corruption,
lower-quality bureaucracies, higher rates of tax evasion, lower rates of participa-
tion in civic activities and professional associations, a lower level of importance
of large firms in the economy, inferior infrastructures, and higher inflation.”1 Ac-
cording to Acemoglu et al. (2005), this type of institutions leads to poor economic
performance.
Barro and McCleary (2003) and McCleary and Barro (2006) examine the influ-
ence of religiosity and attendance on economic growth. Instrumenting for religious
belief and attendance, the authors find that higher levels of religious intensity,
measured by belief in hell, lead to higher rates of economic growth. However,
1La Porta et al. (1997), p. 337-38.
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attending religious services has the opposite impact. Moreover, the authors find
a negative relationship between the Muslim share of the population and economic
growth (Barro and McCleary, 2003; McCleary and Barro, 2006). Using the growth
rate of total factor productivity as a measure of economic development, Noland
(2005) finds that the Muslim share of the population has a positive influence on
growth. It is worth noting that Noland (2005), unlike Barro and McCleary, does
not control for beliefs and attendance.
The negative association found in the literature between Islam and economic
performance is based on samples in which predominantly Muslim countries are
typically under-represented. For example, the findings of La Porta et al. (1997)
are based on a sample of 40 countries with only Turkey, a predominantly Mus-
lim country, and Nigeria being the only other country with a substantial Muslim
presence. Similarly, the negative relationship between the Muslim share of the
population and economic growth found by Barro and McCleary (2003) is based
on a sample with only seven percent are predominantly Muslim countries.
In this chapter I exploit the WVS database to examine the influence of re-
ligious beliefs and attendance on economic growth for a panel of countries with
larger Muslim representation.
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. The following section
provides a review of three papers relevant to the present chapter. Section 2.3
introduces the empirical strategy and the data used in the regression analysis.
Section 2.4 reports the results of the regression and discusses the empirical findings.
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Section 2.5 concludes the chapter.
2.2 Review of the Relevant Literature
In the recently published literature, three papers are of particular relevance to
this chapter. These papers are Barro and McCleary (2003), McCleary and Barro
(2006), and Noland (2005). This section provides a review of the three studies.
At the end of this section a summary review is provided where the limitations of
the studies are highlighted.
2.2.1 Barro and McCleary: Two Studies
Barro and McCleary co-authored two papers: Religion and Economic Growth
across Countries (Barro and McCleary, 2003), and Religion and Economy (Mc-
Cleary and Barro, 2006). In both papers, the authors follow the same empirical
strategy to examine the influence of religion on economic growth. The 2006 pa-
per exploits data for a slightly larger sample of countries, but uses less religiosity
variables. Both studies reach similar conclusions.
Given the similarities in empirical strategies and findings between McCleary
and Barro (2006) and Barro and McCleary (2003), I use “Barro and McCleary”
and “McCleary and Barro” interchangeably to refer to both papers, unless stated
otherwise.
The specifications that Barro and McCleary use in both papers to study the
influence of religion on economic growth can be expressed in the following generic
56
form
Growth = β0 + β1X + β2Religion+  (2.2.1)
where Growth is the growth rate of per capita GDP, X is a vector of economic and
political variables, and Religion is a vector of variables measuring the intensity of
religious belief and the frequency of temple attendance. The religiosity variables
used by Barro and McCleary (2003) are belief in hell, belief in heaven, monthly
temple attendance, and seven religious denominations. In the study of McCleary
and Barro (2006), however, the authors use only belief in hell as a measure of
religiosity and eight religion shares of the population.
Acknowledging the potential problem of endogeneity, McCleary and Barro use
instrumental variables to isolate the sense of causation from religion to economic
growth. The instruments are a measure of religious pluralism based on the Herfind-
ahl index for the religion shares; the religion shares of the population; a dummy
variable for the existence of state religion; and an indicator for the regulation of
the religion market.1
Data on belief in hell, belief in heaven, and monthly temple attendance are
collected from the WVS dataset and supplemented by data from the Gallup and
the ISSP surveys. It is worth noting that the ISSP surveys compile data on belief
in hell and belief in heaven in a way different from the WVS. While the WVS fol-
lows a yes/no format to collect the answers to the question of whether the person
believes in hell and heaven, the ISSP survey offers six options: “(1) yes, definitely;
1The regulation of the religion market is measured by a dummy variable that takes 1 if the
state appoints the religious leaders in the 1970s, 0 otherwise.
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(2) yes, probably; (3) no, probably not; (4) no, definitely not; (5) can’t choose,
don’t know; and (6) NA, refused.” Barro and McCleary do not explain how they
accommodate the ISSP data on belief to the WVS data.
Barro and McCleary (2003) exploit data from the first three waves of WVS.
In the first wave, 1981-1984, 38 countries are observed; in the second wave, 1990-
1993, 41 countries are observed; and in the third wave, 1995–1997, 39 countries
are observed. The authors use the second wave of the WVS (1990-1993) which
covers slightly more countries compared with the two other waves as a reference
to compile the attendance and religiosity data. For countries with missing ob-
servations in 1990-93, Barro and McCleary (2003) use data from the other WVS
waves to fill in the gaps. If the WVS waves do not offer data to fill the gaps,
the authors use the data on a similar variable from the ISSP and the Gallup sur-
veys. McCleary and Barro (2006) follow the same procedure in the compilation
of data on religiosity, although there is a fourth WVS wave considered in the study.
The strategy of waves followed by the WVS in conducting the surveys makes it
more suitable to consider relatively short periods of growth. Nonetheless, in both
studies Barro and McCleary consider three periods of 10 years each: 1965-1975,
1975-1985, and 1985-1995. This means that the religiosity variables sometimes
postdate the dependent variable. Although Barro and McCleary (2003) acknowl-
edge this problem, they argue that this should not pose a problem since religiosity
is relatively stable over time.
The dependent variable is the growth rate of real per capita GDP over the
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three 10-year periods: 1965-1975, 1975-1985, and 1985-1995. Data on GDP per
capita are obtained from the Penn World Tables. Data on the socio-economic
explanatory variables are compiled from the World Bank database. McCleary and
Barro also include in the regression analysis an indicator of democracy obtained
from the Freedom House dataset.
For some explanatory variables data are collected as values at the start of each
period (e.g. GDP per capita, and the rate of male secondary school attainment).
For other explanatory variables, such as the share of investment to GDP and the
share of government consumption to GDP, data are calculated as averages for each
of the three 10-year periods.
In Table (2.1) below, I reproduce the results of Barro and McCleary (2003).
It should be noted that the authors only report the results relative to the religion
variables. Other control variables are included in the regression but their coeffi-
cients are not shown.
The findings of Barro and McCleary (2003) suggest that religion has a statisti-
cally significant influence on economic performance measured by economic growth.
In particular, attending formal religious services once a month has a negative im-
pact on economic growth. Barro and McCleary (2003) rationalize the negative
relationship by appealing to the argument that spending time in religious services
takes resources away from the economy.
With respect to the cognitive dimension of religion, there is evidence that be-
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lief in hell and belief in heaven have a positive influence on economic growth.
According to the results of the estimation, belief in hell has a statistically signifi-
cant influence on economic growth across the various specifications. On the other
hand, belief in heaven is only significant in one specification, where the religion
shares and belief in hell are excluded. A comparison of the magnitude of the co-
efficients show a larger coefficient on belief in hell. According to the authors, this
is an “indication that the fear of hell is more potent for economic growth than is
the prospect of heaven.”1
The results of the regression suggest that the belief and attendance variables
do not account for the total effect of religion. Some residual influence is picked
up by the religious groups. According to the estimated coefficients, the Hindu,
the Muslim, the Christian Orthodox, and the Protestant shares of the population
have a statistically significant negative influence on economic growth. While the
Muslim share of the population has a lesser negative impact on economic growth
than the Hindu and the Christian Orthodox shares, it has a stronger negative
impact than the Protestant share of the population.
To sum up, the findings of Barro and McCleary suggest that while some as-
pects of religiosity have a negative influence on growth, others have the opposite
impact. McCleary and Barro argue that the overall influence of religion “depends
on the extent to which a rise in attendance leads to greater beliefs.”2 It also
depends on the extent to which belonging to a particular denomination implies
observance. Marchisio and Pisati (1999) find that while 90 percent of the sur-
1Barro and McCleary (2003), p. 779.
2Ibid.
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veyed Italians define themselves as Catholics, only 54 percent reported that they
believe in Catholicism without reservations. The findings of Marchisio and Pisati
(1999) suggest that people might associate themselves with a certain system of
beliefs, without necessarily meaning an adherence to the same model of religiosity.
McCleary and Barro (2006) replicate the 2003 exercise for a slightly larger sam-
ple of countries, in which Muslim-majority countries are still under-represented.
Compared to the 2003 study, McCleary and Barro (2006) use monthly temple
attendance and belief in hell as a measure of religious belief. It is likely that the
authors dropped belief in heaven from their 2006 study because it shows less ro-
bustness compared to belief in hell in the 2003 paper (see Table (2.1) above).
The empirical strategy of McCleary and Barro (2006) follows Barro and Mc-
Cleary (2003). The instrumental variables used to isolate the effect of religion on
economic growth are similar to those used in the 2003 paper: a measure of reli-
gious pluralism constructed from the religion shares of the population and derived
as 1 minus the Herfindahl index; the religion shares of the population; a dummy
variable for the existence of state religion; and an indicator for the regulation of
the religion market. The instrumented variables are monthly temple attendance
and belief in hell.
Like in the study of Barro and McCleary (2003), McCleary and Barro (2006)
find that attending a temple once a month has a negative influence on economic
growth, while believing in hell has a positive influence. Results also suggest that
the Muslim and the Protestant shares of the population have a negative influence
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on economic growth. Furthermore, agreeing with Barro and McCleary (2003),
McCleary and Barro (2006) find that the Muslim share of the population has a
stronger negative influence on economic growth compared to the Protestant share.
In one specification, McCleary and Barro (2006) exclude the attendance and belief
variables, and only include the religion shares of the population. According to the
results of the regression, the coefficient on the Protestant share remains negative
and significant. By contrast, the coefficient on the Muslim share of the population
becomes insignificant. The results of the regression also suggest that adhering to
Hinduism has a positive influence on economic growth.
2.2.2 Noland (2005)
Noland (2005) examines the influence of religion on economic growth with a fo-
cus on Islam. The author estimates a set of specifications that can be expressed
generically as in (2.2.1). The dependent variable, measuring growth, takes two
forms: the growth rate of per capita GDP, and the growth rate of total factor
productivity (TFP). It should be noted that unlike Barro and McCleary, Noland
(2005) does not control for attendance and beliefs. He only uses the religion shares
of the population. To simplify the exposition of Noland’s findings, in what follows
I refer to the specification where the dependent variable is the growth rate of per
capita GDP as the per capita regression. However, when the dependent variable
is the growth rate of TFP, the specification is referred to as the TFP regression.
The paper of Noland (2005) consists of three parts. Part one, which is rather
general, examines the impact of religion on economic growth. Various religious
groups are employed, including the Muslim share of the population. In part two
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the author focuses on Islam by examining the question of whether Islam is a drag
on growth. In part three, the author examines the impact of religion on growth
in three countries with substantial Muslim presence. These countries with their
respective shares of the population adhering to Islam are Ghana (15.90), India
(13.40), and Malaysia (60.40).
Religion and Economic Growth
Using data for a cross section of countries, part one of Noland’s paper estimates a
model of economic fundamentals along with seven religious shares of the popula-
tion. The religious groups are Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists, Orthodox Christians,
Catholics, Jews, and Protestants. The dependent variables are the growth rate
of GDP per capita over 1970-1990, and the growth rate of TFP over 1973-1984.
According to the empirical results, the estimated coefficients on the economic vari-
ables have the expected signs. In particular, initial GDP per capita is negatively
associated with economic growth, suggesting that the countries of the sample
exhibit convergence conditional on the other variables. Moreover, both capital
accumulation, measured by the ratio of investment to GDP, and education are
positively associated with economic growth.
With respect to religion, only two religious groups out of the seven included in
the regression have a significant influence on economic growth, measured by the
growth rate of GDP per capita. According to the results of the regression, both
the Catholic and the Protestant shares of the population have a negative influ-
ence on economic growth. The results for the other religious groups, including the
Muslim share of the population, are insignificant. In the TFP regression none of
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the religion shares is significant.
Next, Noland (2005) studies the influence of religion, always measured by the
religion shares of the population, on economic growth for a longer period of time.
The dependent variable is the growth rate of GDP per capita, calculated over a
period of 86 years, stretching from 1913 to 1998. In the absence of conventional
economic variables, Noland (2005) uses latitude, Nobel laureates per capita, and
a democracy indicator. The sample size consists of 34 countries, including Turkey
the only Muslim-majority country.
According to the results of the regression, religion has a positive influence on
economic growth. The coefficients associated with the Buddhist and the Orthodox
Christian shares of the population are statistically significant and have positive
signs. Furthermore, there is evidence, though statistically weak, that adhering to
Catholicism and Protestantism has a positive influence on economic growth.
To sum up, with respect to Islam, part one of the study of Noland (2005) finds
a statistically insignificant influence of the Muslim share of the population on
economic growth. It is noteworthy that this result is in agreement with Barro and
McCleary (2003) and McCleary and Barro (2006) who find that after excluding
the attendance and belief variables, the impact of the Muslim share is statistically
not different from zero.
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Islam and Economic Growth
In part two, Noland (2005) looks into the question of whether Islam has a nega-
tive influence on economic growth. Two dependent variables are considered: the
growth rate of TFP over the period 1973-1984, and the growth rate of per capita
GDP over the period 1970-1990. The sample consists of a cross section of coun-
tries and the total number of observations is 50 for the TFP specifications, and
78 for the GDP per capita specifications.
In the regression analysis, the author considers the Muslim and the Arab shares
of the population. The Arab share of the population is included in the regression
to disentangle any influence of the Islamic faith from that of Arab culture. The
two variables are considered in two different forms: as simple shares of the popula-
tion, and as the shares of the population weighed by the distance between Mecca
and the capital city of each country in the sample. Noland (2005) argues that di-
viding the Muslim share of the population by the distance proxies for the various
interpretations of Islam and the variety of Islamic beliefs across countries. On the
other hand, weighing the Arab share of the population by the distance between
Mecca and the capital city controls for the attenuation of Arab and Middle East-
ern culture taken by Arabs to other territories as Islam spread out.
Table (2.2) below reproduces the results of the regression as reported by Noland
(2005). It should be noted that Noland does not include the Muslim and the Arab
shares of the population together in one equation, he rather considers them sepa-
rately.
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According to the results of the estimation, initial GDP per capita has the
expected negative sign, suggesting that the countries of the sample exhibit con-
vergence. The ratio of investment to GDP and education have positive coef-
ficients, suggesting that more capital accumulation and more schooling lead to
more growth.
Regarding the influence of culture on economic growth, the empirical results
show that the Muslim and the Arab shares of the population are only significant
in the TFP regressions. According to the estimated coefficients, countries with
larger Muslim and Arab populations tend to be associated with good economic
performance measured by the growth rate of TFP.
Islam and Economic Growth: Country Level Analysis
In the third and final part of his study, Noland (2005) examines the influence of
Islam on economic performance at the country level. Three countries with sub-
stantial Muslim presence are selected. The countries with their respective Muslim
share of the population are Ghana (15.9), India (13.4), and Malaysia (60.4).
For the Indian case, the author considers two specifications. In the first one
the dependent variable is the growth rate of TFP over a period of 20 years, from
1973 to 1993. In the second specification the dependent variable is the growth rate
of GDP per capita over a period of 15 years, from 1981 to 1996. The explanatory
variables consist of a set of economic variables along with six religious groups,
including the share of the population adhering to Islam.
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According to the results of the estimation, adhering to Buddhism and Jainism
has a statistically significant positive impact on economic growth, measured by
the growth rate of per capita income. The influence of the Muslim share of the
population is not statistically different from zero. In the TFP regression, however,
none of the religion shares has a statistically significant influence.
Like India, Malaysia is a religiously diverse country. Statistically, about 60
percent of Malaysians are Muslims and Islam is the religion of the state. After
controlling for economic factors, the results of the regression suggest that Islam
and Buddhism, measured by their respective shares of the population, have a neg-
ative influence, although statistically weak, on economic growth in Malaysia. It
is worth mentioning that the significance of the Muslim share of the population
improves once the economic controls are excluded from the regression.
The last case in the country-level analysis is Ghana. According to the results
of the regression, there is a positive relationship between the Muslim share of the
population and economic growth. This suggests that areas with larger Muslim
shares of the population tend to outperform other parts of the country.
To sum up, in the country-level analysis evidence on the influence of Islam is
mixed. Measured by the Muslim share of the population, Islam has a positive
influence on economic growth in Ghana, whereas in Malaysia its influence is nega-
tive. With respect to India, the Muslim share of the population has a statistically
insignificant impact on economic growth.
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2.2.3 Summary of the Review
In their 2003 and 2006 studies, Barro and McCleary examine the influence of re-
ligious beliefs and attendance on economic growth for a panel of predominantly
Christian countries. Instrumenting for the religiosity variables, the authors find
that religious belief leads to higher levels of economic growth, whereas attending
religious services has a deleterious effect. Running regressions on cross-country
and within-country data, Noland (2005) finds that religion, measured by the reli-
gion shares of the population, has an influence on growth, measured by the growth
rate of per capita GDP and the growth rate of TFP. According to the findings of
Noland, Islam, when it influences economic growth, has a positive impact.
However, the three studies have some limitations. All studies use samples
of countries that are predominantly Christian, and predominantly Muslim coun-
tries are relatively under-represented. Hence, the natural question that follows is
whether the findings of the literature hold for a sample with larger Muslim repre-
sentation.
With respect to Noland (2005), the author uses the religion share of the popu-
lation as the sole measure of religion. Noland (2005) does not use any measures of
religious behaviour, such as temple attendance and religious beliefs. The problem
with the religion share is that it is too broad to be analytically meaningful.
A further issue with Noland (2005) is the econometric handling of the Mus-
lim and the Arab shares of the population. In his examination of whether Islam
is a drag on growth (results reproduced in Table (2.2) above), Noland does not
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consider a specification where both variables, the Muslim and the Arab shares of
the population, are included. This is a serious problem since it is unknown which
variable is doing the explanatory work.
The use of the growth rate of TFP as a measure of economic growth is prob-
lematic. An examination of the results reproduced in Table (2.2), above, show
that the Muslim share of the population is only significant in the specifications
where the dependent variable is the growth rate of TFP. It is well known that the
TFP observations are obtained as estimates, and, hence, subject to the produc-
tion function used, its underlying assumptions, and the right hand side variables
employed. It is questionable, then, whether the growth rate of TFP is a reliable
measure of economic performance.
Compared to Noland (2005), who does not include measures of attendance and
religious intensity in his study and does not control for endogeneity, the studies of
Barro and McCleary represent more rigorous attempts to examine the influence of
religion on economic growth. Unlike Noland (2005), Barro and McCleary (2003)
and McCleary and Barro (2006) consider measures of religious engagement along
with the religion shares of the population.
However, the strategy followed by McCleary and Barro in compiling the data
on religiosity and the choice of the belief variables suffer from some limitations.
Based on the assumption that religious behaviour is relatively stable over time,
Barro and McCleary (2003) and McCleary and Barro (2006) aggregate the data
on attendance and beliefs from the different waves of the WVS, with levels geared
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towards 1990-1993.
The argument about the stability of religious behaviour over time is question-
able. Maalouf (1998) argues that people tend to emphasize the dimension of their
identity that they feel is most threatened. Studying discrimination against Mus-
lims and Islamophobia after September 11, Sheridan (2006) finds that there is
a widespread feeling among Muslims that there is an increase in discrimination
and racism. Racism, discrimination, and the association of Islam with terrorism,
fuelled the feeling among Muslims that Islam is targeted. In retaliation, Muslims,
reportedly, became more religious. In their book The Muslim World After 9/11,
Rabasa et al. (2004) report that the Tunisian society became more religious after
2001. Similarly, “The Arab Muslim American Federation of New York reported
that, after 9/11 attacks, Muslim attendance at New York City mosques doubled.”1.
More recently, after the toppling of Ben Ali in Tunisia, the country has “witnessed
a surge of religiosity within society following the liberation of mosques and the
support of religious freedom.”2
Another issue with the studies of McCleary and Barro is the choice of the belief
variables. Barro and McCleary (2003) and McCleary and Barro (2006) use belief
in heaven and belief in hell as measures of religiosity. These beliefs are not robust
across religions. In some faiths, such as Hinduism and Buddhism, the process of
salvation and damnation takes forms other than heaven and hell. In this sense,
not believing in hell and heaven does not mean any less religious commitment.
1Abu Ras et al. (2008), p. 156
2Ghanmi, M. (2012). Religiosity on the Rise in Post-Revolution Tunisia. Magharebia (Media
Report), 3 August.
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In this chapter I address the issues outlined above, and investigate the influence
of religion of economic growth for a panel of countries with substantial Muslim
presence. More than sixty percent of the countries of the sample have 50 percent
or more of the population adhering to Islam. The following section outlines the
empirical strategy.
2.3 Empirical Strategy
Following Barro and McCleary, I estimate a specification that can be expressed
as in (2.2.1), namely
Growth = β0 + β1X + β2Religion+ 
where Growth stands for growth rate of real GDP per capita, X is a vector of
economic and political variables, and Religion is a vector of variables measuring
religious behaviour. The model, above, is estimated for a panel of countries with
substantial Muslim presence.
Over the years more Muslim-majority countries are covered by the WVS.
Nonetheless, these countries are still under-represented and their total number
remains relatively small. In order to maximize the number of observations, coun-
tries with a Muslim share of the population of 10 percent and more are selected.
The total number of countries in the sample is 27 and the sample period covers
four waves of 5-years each stretching from 1990 to 2010. Nevertheless, because
not all countries are observed each wave the total number of observations is 50.
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The sample consists of five Arab countries, that is 18 percent of the sam-
ple size. Seven countries, that is 26 percent of the sample, are located in Sub-
Saharan Africa. Nine countries, that is one third of the sample, are located in
Asia. Twenty-two percent of the countries of the sample had Soviet-style govern-
ments in the past. Countries with a Muslim share of the population of 50 percent
and more represent about 63 percent of the sample. The list of the countries is
reported in Table (B1) of Appendix B.
Since 1990 the WVS surveys are conducted every five years. The strategy
followed by WVS makes it natural to compile data on the dependent variable,
economic growth rate, over relatively short periods. In the present study, I con-
sider four 5-year periods: 1990-1995, 1995-2000, 2000-2005, and 2005-2010.
In the growth literature there is no conventional way of choosing the length
of the growth periods. For example, Gregorio (1992) uses periods of six years.
Beck et al. (2000) and Choe (2003) use periods of five years. Barro and McCleary
(2003) and McCleary and Barro (2006) use periods of ten years.
The findings of the previous chapter suggest that Islam is not monolithic,
and that there is a variety of Islamic beliefs that map onto different attitudes
towards women and foreigners. In particular, being a religious person, believing
in the importance of religion and God in life tend to be associated with intoler-
ance towards strangers, and negative attitudes towards women (Table (1.2) in the
previous chapter). In this chapter I consider the same religiosity variables and a
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measure of temple attendance to control for religious behaviour across countries.
The individual-level data collected by the WVS are aggregated to the country
level for each of the four variables measuring religious behaviour. Barro and Mc-
Cleary (2003) and McCleary and Barro (2006) use attending once a month as a
measure of temple attendance. In the present study, I instead consider attend-
ing once a week. Muslims believe that attending Friday prayers at the mosque is
compulsory. Thus, weekly attendance is a better measure of religious commitment.
The attendance and belief variables are included in the regression along with
economic and political controls. Following Barro and McCleary, the economic and
political variables are initial GDP per capita–that is the values of per capita in-
come in 1990, 1995, 2000, and 2005; the average ratio of investment to GDP over
each period; the average inflation rate over each period, the average ratio of trade
to GDP filtered for country size (land and population); a measure of the output
of the research and development sector (following Romer (1990)); the value of the
index of democracy in the beginning of each period, that is in 1990, 1995, 2000,
and 2005. The dependent variable is the growth rate of real GDP per capita over
the four periods: 1990-1995, 1995-2000, 2000-2005, and 2005-2010.
The relationship between religion and economic growth raises the classic prob-
lem of endogeneity. With religion viewed as an explanatory variable, one might
hypothesize that religion by influencing individual attitudes affects economic out-
comes (Weber (1905), for example). However, with religion considered as a de-
pendent variable, it is plausible to argue that different levels of wealth map onto
different religious behaviour (Iannaccone (1990), for example). To isolate the di-
75
rection of causation from religion to economic growth, I use instrumental variables.
The instruments are a dummy variable for Soviet past; a measure of religious plu-
ralism; the distance in kilometres between the capital city of each country and
Mecca, Saudi Arabia; and dummy variables for three geographic locations: Asia,
Europe, and Sub-Saharan Africa.
2.4 Results and Discussion
The results of the regression are reported in Table (2.3) below. According to the
empirical findings, initial GDP per capita has the expected negative coefficient
suggesting that the economies of the sample exhibit convergence conditional on
the other variables. The results also suggest a statistically significant positive
association between capital accumulation and economic growth. The estimated
coefficient on inflation is strongly significant and has a negative sign, suggesting
that sound monetary policies stimulate economic growth.
According to the estimated coefficient, trade openness, measured by the ra-
tio of exports plus imports to GDP filtered for the country size (population and
land area), does not have a significant influence on economic growth. This result
suggests that openness to international trade has a mixed influence on economic
growth. There is evidence in the empirical literature that international trade is
not always beneficial. According to the Singer-Prebisch hypothesis, the impact
of international trade on economic growth depends on what countries specialize
in. The hypothesis states that specializing in the exportation of raw materials
and primary commodities deteriorates the terms of trade (Singer, 1950). Study-
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Table 2.3: Religiosity and Economic Growth
Growth Rate (1) (2) (3) (4)
Intercept 10.940** 9.640* 11.388** 10.559**
(3.932) (4.444) (4.137) (3.562)
Initial GDP per capita -1.006* -0.503 -0.72 -0.788
(0.495) (0.450) (0.428) (0.426)
Investment 0.081 0.129* 0.116* 0.114*
(0.055) (0.060) (0.053) (0.052)
Inflation -0.028** -0.028** -0.032** -0.032**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Trade openness 0.0002 -0.001 0.0002 -0.004
(0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009)
R & D 0.003 -0.005 0.0005 0.002
(0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004)
Democracy index 0.015 -0.097 0.007 -0.029
(0.123) (0.158) (0.123) (0.123)
Attendance (once a week) -0.035*
(0.017)
Belief Religious Religion is God is
person important important
-0.051 -0.060* -0.052*
(0.035) (0.029) (0.022)
Muslim share -0.002 -0.007 0.007 0.011
(0.011) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013)
Arab country -0.168 -0.734 -0.09 0.040
(1.121) (1.267) (1.125) (1.113)
Wald χ2(9) 52.04** 40.33** 51.93** 54.75**
Number of Observations 50 50 50 50
Number of Countries 27 27 27 27
Notes: G2SLS IV regressions. The instrumented variables are the attendance
and belief variables. The instruments are a dummy variable for Soviet past; a
measure of religious pluralism; the distance in kilometres between the capital
city and Mecca, Saudi Arabia; dummy variables for the three geographic lo-
cations Asia, Europe, and Sub-Saharan Africa. The standard errors reported
in parentheses. The symbols ** and * mean that the coefficient is statistically
significant at the 1 and 5 percent level, respectively.
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ing the Jamaican case, Gafar (1995) finds that the deterioration of the terms of
trade between 1972 and 1986 led to an annual loss of about 1.5 percent of GDP.
More recently, exploiting historical data going back to 1650 on the prices of 25
commodities, Harvey et al. (2010) find that eleven commodities exhibit a decline
in their prices over the whole sample period or over some parts of it.
The results of the estimation show that the research and development activity
is positively associated with economic growth, although the estimated coefficient
is statistically insignificant. The coefficient on the democracy index is statistically
insignificant. The insignificance of the coefficient suggests that democracy has a
mixed influence on economic growth. It is also possible that the insignificance of
the coefficient on the democracy index is due to technical issues related to the
construction of the index (Munck and Verkuilen, 2002).
Now we turn our attention to the attendance and belief variables. The results
of the regression reported in Table (2.3) suggest a statistically significant influence
of attendance and beliefs on economic growth. The religion variables I employ are
self description as religious, the importance of religion in life, the importance of
God in life, and attending religious services once a week. It is worth noting that
the religiosity variables used in this chapter differ from the belief variables used
by Barro and McCleary (2003) and McCleary and Barro (2006). Barro and Mc-
Cleary use belief in hell and belief in heaven as measures of religious intensity.
These variables are not robust across religions. In some systems of beliefs, the
salvation and the damnations processes take forms other than heaven and hell.
Hence, not believing in hell and heaven does not mean any less religious commit-
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ment.
In Column (1), only the attendance variable (once a week), is included in the
regression. In Columns (2) to (4), only variables measuring religiosity and belief
are used. It should be noted that I also considered specifications where both the
belief and attendance variables are included. However, the results are statistically
insignificant. It is likely that the high correlation between the two dimensions of
religiosity cause multicollinearity. Results are reported in Table B2 of Appendix B.
According to the results of the estimation reported in Table (2.3), there is
evidence that high levels of religious involvement, measured by attendance and
beliefs, are associated with low economic performance, measured by the growth
rate of per capita GDP. In particular, there is a negative association between
attending religious services once a week and economic growth, suggesting that
higher rates of temple attendance lead to lower economic performance.
This result is in agreement with the findings of Barro and McCleary (2003)
and McCleary and Barro (2006). In both studies, the authors find that temple
attendance has a negative influence on economic growth. McCleary and Barro
rationalize the negative association between attendance and economic growth by
appealing to the way attendance detracts from spending time on economically
productive activities. Alternatively, one might argue that attending religious ser-
vices negatively influences economic growth by deepening and stressing the type
of attitudes that are deleterious to economic growth.
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With respect to the cognitive dimension of religion, that is belief, the results of
the regression reported in Columns (3) and (4) suggest that too much religiosity
leads to low economic growth. In particular, countries with high shares of indi-
viduals for whom religion and God are important in life tend to have low rates of
economic growth. By contrast, the results of the regression reported in Column
(2) suggest that self-description as religious has a statistically insignificant influ-
ence on economic growth. Finally, according to the results of the estimation the
Arab and the Muslim shares of the population are statistically insignificant.
My findings in this chapter are consistent with the findings of McCleary and
Barro. Using a sample with little Muslim representation, Barro and McCleary
(2003) and McCleary and Barro (2006) find a negative relationship between the
Muslim share of the population and economic growth. By contrast, my findings
relative to a sample with a larger Muslim representation suggest that the influ-
ence of the Muslim share of the population is statistically not different from zero.
However, there is a statistically significant negative influence of belief and atten-
dance on economic growth. In other words, the negative coefficient on the Muslim
share of the population found by McCleary and Barro is plausibly picking up the
negative influence of belief and attendance on growth in countries with substantial
Muslim presence found in this chapter.
With respect to the influence of religious belief on growth, my findings are
in disagreement with those of Barro and McCleary. While Barro and McCleary
(2003) and McCleary and Barro (2006) find that belief in hell has a positive in-
fluence on growth, I find that believing in the importance of God and religion
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in life has a deleterious effect on growth. Unless we were to assume that belief
in hell, as a measure of religious intensity, is somehow picking up something dif-
ferent compared to the belief in the importance of God and religion in life, one
could argue that compared to Christian-majority countries, religiosity in countries
with substantial Muslim presence produces the sort of attitudes that are inimi-
cal to economic growth. In fact, the correlations reported in Table (1.2) above
show a strong association between religiosity and intolerance towards immigrants
and conservative attitudes towards the role of women in society. Consistent with
the findings of the previous chapter, the negative attitudes towards women and
intolerance towards strangers are plausible channels through which the negative
influence of religion on economic growth works in countries with substantial Mus-
lim presence.
Throughout this chapter the discussion has focused on how religion could plau-
sibly affect economic growth by influencing individual attitudes. Religion might
also have an influence on social capital and trust building. The way individuals
interact with each other and the type of network of relationships they create (for
example, whether these networks are inclusive or exclusive of the Other) might
have an impact on social relations and plausibly on economic performance. Re-
ligion might have an even greater impact if the attitudes that it generates are
institutionalized. For example, if discrimination against women and anti-Muslim
feelings are built into state institutions such as the judiciary and the educational
system, then religion might have a doubly negative impact on economic perfor-
mance.
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The figures reported in Table (3.4) are measures of various attitudes towards
women in Saudi Arabia in 2003. The data suggest a strong bias against women
in the Saudi society. According to the data about 70 percent of Saudis agree that
men should be prioritized when jobs are scarce, and think that being a house-
wife is as fulfilling as working for a pay. The data also suggest that three in four
Saudis think that university is more important for boys than girls.1 In Saudi
Arabia individuals may have negative attitudes towards the role of women in so-
ciety, but official institutions such as the educational system reinforce these type
of attitudes. Hamdan (2005) argues that “[w]omen’ issues in Saudi society and
the gender inequalities that are obvious in its education system are institutional-
ized.”2 This dynamic has created a situation whereby any state-led reforms that
aim at granting more rights for women are faced with opposition. “Indeed, the
opening of official schools for girls [in Saudi Arabia were] met with fervent oppo-
sition. Non-religious education of girls was considered useless and even, according
to certain conservative religious scholars, dangerous.”3
Religion still plays a central role in people’s lives in several societies–including
predominantly Muslim societies. For many, as Marx wrote over a 150 years ago,
1Despite the overwhelming conservative majority suggested by the figures reported in Table
(2.4), the results of a survey reported by Hamdan (2005) suggest an ongoing struggle in Saudi
society between women rights advocates and conservatives. “In his study (1975) entitled Percep-
tion of Female Students from the Countries of the Arab Gulf, Al Kotob interviewed 519 female
students. He notes that 79 percent of his respondents agreed strongly that women should have
the same opportunities as men, 70 percent insisted that Master’s and Doctorate level degrees
are suitable for women in the Gulf region, and 80 percent indicated that university education
should be co-educational. With regards to marriage, 94.8 percent of the participants supported
education prior to marriage. In relation to the subjects of study available to women, 94.2 percent
agreed that women should not be confined to certain subjects and should be able to study in
any field.”
2Hamdan (2005), p. 45.
3Ibid., p. 50.
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Table 2.4: Various Attitudes Towards Women in Saudi Arabia in 2003
Agree Disagree N
When Jobs are scarce, men should be prioritized 69.7 8.6 1,480
University is more important for boys† 74.6 25.4 1,425
Men make better politicians than women† 61.9 38.1 1,447
Being a housewife is as fulfilling as working for pay† 68.8 31.2 1,396
Wife must obey† 81.3 5.4 1,494
Notes: Figures are expressed in percentage.
† Agree (disagree) is the sum of the percentages of individuals who strongly agree
(strongly disagree) and individuals who agree (disagree).
Data source: WVS database.
religion is “the general theory of this world, its encyclopedic compendium, its logic
in popular form, its spiritual point d’honneur, its enthusiasm, its moral sanction,
its solemn complement, and its universal basis of consolation and justification.”1
Hume (1757) argues that “[t]he primary religion of mankind arises chiefly from
an anxious fear of future events.”2 Similarly, Freud (1927) claims that man in his
search for protection against alien forces created God. According to Freud belief in
God is a collective neurosis caused by the longing for a father–a protector. Echo-
ing Freud, La Barre (1972) writes that “a god is only a shaman’s dream about his
father.”3 Religion helps humans to handle uncertainty, and this is perhaps what
keeps it in high demand in many societies.
The sample period I use in this study covers four waves. However not all
countries are observed in all waves. Depending on the availability of data on
the religion variables, the distribution of countries per number of observations is
1Marx (1843), p. 131.
2Hume (1757), p. 61.
3La Barre (1972), p. 19.
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as follows: all countries of the sample are observed once–though not in the same
wave; 36 countries are observed twice; only four countries are observed three times;
and 16 countries are observed four times. In order to check whether results are
driven by the countries that are observed more than others, I rerun the regressions
reported in Table (2.3) for the sub-sample of countries observed two times and
the sub-sample of countries observed four times. Obviously it is not possible to
perform this exercise on the sub-sample of countries observed three times, and
this is due to the limited number of observations. The results of the regressions
are insignificant and they are reported in Tables (B4) and (B5) of Appendix B.
2.5 Concluding Remarks
Exploiting data from the WVS database, this chapter has studied the influence of
religion on economic growth for a panel of countries with substantial Muslim pres-
ence. The religiosity variables are measures of whether the individual is religious,
believe in the importance of God in life, believe in the importance of religion in
life, and whether she or he attends formal religious services once a week. The
data on these variables are aggregated to the country level. Economic growth is
measured by the growth rate of real GDP per capita over four periods of five years
each, namely 1990-1995, 1995-2000, 2000-2005, and 2005-2010.
Instrumenting for the belief and attendance variables, I find that higher levels
of religiosity lead to lower levels of economic performance. In particular, countries
with higher levels of temple attendance are associated with lower rates of economic
growth. Moreover, countries with high shares of the population believing in the
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importance of God and religion in life tend to have poor economic performance.
According to the estimated coefficients, attending religious services once a week
is found to have the strongest negative influence on economic growth, followed by
the belief in the importance of God in life, and the belief in the importance of
religion in life.
With respect to the influence of temple attendance on growth, the findings of
this chapter are in agreement with the findings of Barro and McCleary. However,
there is a disagreement over the influence of religious belief. In this study I find
that higher levels of religiosity lead to lower rates of economic growth. This sug-
gests that religiosity in countries with substantial Muslim presence produces the
type of attitudes that stifle economic growth.
My findings in this chapter are consistent with the findings of the previous
chapter. In the first chapter, I find that higher levels of religious engagement are
associated with conservatism towards women and intolerance towards foreigners.
I also find that these types of attitudes are deleterious to FDI. In this chapter, I
find that higher levels of religious engagement map onto lower rates of economic
growth. Hence, the negative attitudes towards women and intolerance towards
foreigners are plausible channels through which the negative influence of religion
on growth works.
An interesting question that follows and will be taken up in the following
chapter is whether there are other attitudes through which religion influences eco-
nomic performance. Specifically, how do different patterns of religious behaviour
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in predominantly Muslim countries map onto economically relevant attitudes?
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Chapter 3
Religiosity
and Economic Attitudes
3.1 Introduction
In chapter one of this dissertation the empirical evidence suggests that differ-
ent levels of openness (both internal and external) map onto different levels of
FDI performance. In particular, low degrees of openness lead to poor FDI perfor-
mance. I also find that higher levels of religiosity are associated with lower degrees
of openness. In chapter two the empirical results show that religious belief and
attendance have a negative influence on economic growth. Internal openness and
external cultural openness that are found to be associated with religiosity are plau-
sible channels through which the negative influence of religion on growth works.
Following up on these findings, the question that this chapter asks is whether
there are other economically relevant attitudes influenced by religion that could
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explain the negative influence of religion on economic performance. Specifically,
I investigate the way in which different patterns of individual religious behaviour
in predominantly Muslim countries map onto economically relevant attitudes.
Studying the relationship between cultural values and the stock market, de Jong
and Semenov (2002) find that masculinity and uncertainty avoidance are positively
associated with stock market development. In masculine cultures, people favour
competition and values such as “the importance of showing off, of performing, of
achieving something visible, of making money, of ‘big is beautiful’.”1 However, in
feminine societies there is a tendency to emphasize equality and solidarity. The
values that make a society feminine (or masculine) are found to be associated
with religion. Studying the influence of religion on economically relevant atti-
tudes, Guiso et al. (2003) find that different patterns of religious behaviour and
different belief systems map onto different economically relevant attitudes such
as competition and income differences. Muslims, for example, tend to have anti-
market attitudes. Also, they tend to be intolerant towards immigrants and other
races, and have conservative attitudes towards the role of women in society (Guiso
et al., 2003).
However, the findings of Guiso et al. (2003) with respect to Islam are based
on a sample with little Muslim representation. The bulk of the sample consists of
individuals from Christian background, and only about five percent report Islam
as their religion. It is not known whether the findings of Guiso et al. (2003) with
respect to Islam hold for samples with larger Muslim representation.
1Hofstede (1983), p. 85.
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This chapter exploits the WVS database, in particular the last two waves
which cover more predominantly Muslim countries. WVS offers data on 17 pre-
dominantly Muslim countries, with a total number of observations varying between
27,501 and 50,721, depending on the availability of data. Among the countries
covered by WVS are Azerbaijan, Iran, and Iraq–three predominantly Shi’ite coun-
tries. This allows for the opportunity to study ways in which religiosity in Sunni-
majority and Shi’ite-majority countries influence economically relevant attitudes.
Seventeen dependent variables are selected. These variables, gathered in six
groups, are measures of individual opinions and views towards a number of eco-
nomically relevant issues, namely: attitudes towards the role of women in society;
trusting others; respect of state institutions; respect of legal regulations; attitudes
about the market; and attitudes towards immigrants and people from different
cultural backgrounds. The explanatory variables measuring religiosity considered
in this chapter are those found to have a significant influence on economic growth
in chapter two. The variables are the belief that God is important in life, the
belief that religion is important in life, and attending formal religious services. I
also consider a measure of disbelief, namely whether the person is an atheist. The
regression analysis is performed on a sample of individuals from predominantly
Sunni countries, and replicated for a sample of individuals from Shi’ite-majority
countries.
The findings of the empirical analysis suggest that, overall, there are more
similarities than differences between the ways religiosity influences attitudes in
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predominantly Sunni countries compared to predominantly Shi’ite countries. Re-
ligiosity is found in both groups of countries to encourage conservative attitudes
towards women. It is also found to be associated with intolerance towards im-
migrants and individuals from different cultural backgrounds. These findings are
consistent with the findings of chapters one and three of this dissertation, where
results suggest that religion by producing negative attitudes towards women and
strangers leads to poor economic performance measured by FDI and economic
growth.
Religiosity is found to be associated with pro-market attitudes in predomi-
nantly Sunni countries–the majority of Muslims in the world. Individuals from
Sunni-majority countries who believe in the importance of God and religion in
life, tend to think that competition is good, and that larger income differences
work as incentives. These findings do not agree with Guiso et al. (2003) who find
that Muslims are associated with anti-market attitudes. Furthermore, religios-
ity in both predominantly Sunni and predominantly Shi’ite countries encourages
confidence in state institutions and the respect of law. Empirical findings also sug-
gest that religiosity in predominantly Muslim societies increased after the event
of September 11. This result agrees with the findings of the literature (Rabasa
et al. (2004), for example), and lends support to the hypothesis of Maalouf (1998)
who argues that individuals tend to emphasize the dimension of their identity that
they feel is most threatened.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. The following section reviews
the study of Guiso et al. (2003). Section 3.3 presents the variables used in the
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empirical analysis. Section 3.4 reports the results of the regression. Section 3.5
concludes the chapter.
3.2 Review of Guiso et al. (2003)
Guiso and his associates use the WVS database in order to examine the influence of
religious behaviour on individual attitudes that are believed to affect economic out-
comes. The authors consider 26 dependent variables grouped in seven categories.
These variables measure individual “attitudes towards (1) trust and cooperation,
(2) women, (3) the government, (4) the law, (5) the market, (6) thriftiness, and
(7) the fairness of the market.”1
For example, the second category (i.e. attitudes towards women) groups vari-
ables measuring individual views regarding the right of women to education and
work. Guiso et al. (2003) argue that the attitudes a society has towards the role of
women in society might have an impact on the labour market. Another example is
the fifth category which includes variables measuring opinions about the market.
Examples of these opinions are whether the individual thinks that larger income
inequalities work as an incentive, and whether competition is good or harmful.
In their empirical analysis, Guiso et al. (2003) regress each of the 26 depen-
dent variables on an array of variables measuring religious involvement, along with
measures of socio-demographic characteristics. The religion variables are whether
the individual was raised religiously, whether she or he does not believe in God
1For a discussion of these variables, see Guiso et al. (2003), p. 232. For the full list of the
26 dependent variables, see p. 238-42.
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(i.e. atheist), whether the respondent is currently religious (i.e. attend religious
services once a year), and whether she or he is actively religious (i.e. attend re-
ligious services once a week). The socio-demographic controls are a subjective
measure of the state of health, gender (male), age, education, self-perceived social
class, and income. Guiso et al. (2003) also control for country-fixed effects. The
total number of observations ranges between 52,252 to 95,739 depending on the
availability of data on the dependent variable. According to the figures reported
by Guiso et al. (2003) 60 percent of the respondents are Christian, 17 percent have
no religious affiliation, and only 5 percent report Islam as their religion.
Since the focus is on religiosity in its connection with the economically relevant
attitudes, in what follows I report only the findings of Guiso et al. (2003) with
respect to religion.
The Overall Influence of Religion
In the first part of their study, Guiso et al. (2003) look at the overall influence
of religion on economically relevant attitudes without any distinction between the
various religious denominations.
According to the results of the OLS regression, religiosity, measured by raised
religiously, currently religious (i.e. attend once a year), and actively religious (i.e.
attend once a week), tends to be associated with trust, respect of institutions and
the law, and the belief in the fairness of the market. On the other hand, religiosity
is associated with intolerance towards immigrants and other races. It also fosters
conservative attitudes towards the role of women in society. By contrast, atheists
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tend to be associated with the opposite attitudes. They have less confidence in
state institutions, have anti-market attitudes, more inclined to break the law,
have progressive attitudes towards women, more tolerant towards other races and
immigrants, and tend to trust others.
Influence of Dominant Religion
In the second part of their study, Guiso et al. (2003) investigate the influence
of religious behaviour on attitudes when the respondent belongs to the country’s
dominant religion. The authors argue that some aspects of the dominant reli-
gion, by force of habit, become part of individual’s behaviour without implying
religious commitment. Hence, it is possible that being religious and belonging
to the country’s dominant religion is different from being religious in a minority
religion. In order to disentangle the effect of the dominant religion from that of
the minority religion, Guiso and his colleagues consider the same measures of re-
ligious behaviour (raised religiously, currently religious (i.e. attend once a year),
and actively religious (i.e. attend once a week)), and their adjusted versions for
whether the individual adheres to the dominant religion of the country.
The results of the regression suggest that individuals brought up religiously
in the dominant religion tend to have more confidence in police and the military
compared to their peers from other religions. With respect to attitudes towards
women, the influence of the dominant religion is unclear. While being raised re-
ligiously in the dominant religion tends to foster conservative attitudes, actively
religious individuals in the dominant religion are found to have the opposite atti-
tudes. Regardless of whether the individual belongs to the dominant religion or
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another religion, religiosity tends to be associated with the respect of legal rules.
The findings of Guiso et al. (2003) also show that individuals brought up religiously
in the dominant religion tend to be associated with low levels of trust. With re-
spect to attitudes towards the market, the results of the regression suggest that
the influence of being religious in the dominant religion is null (Guiso et al., 2003).
The dominance of a religion tends to be associated with intolerance. In this
respect, Guiso et al. (2003) find that Catholics tend to be intolerant in Catholic-
dominated societies. However, they tend to be tolerant in predominantly Protes-
tant societies. Similarly, Protestants are less tolerant in predominantly Protestant
countries than in predominantly Catholic countries. An interesting result is that
Jews tend to trust the government more in predominantly Protestant countries,
compared to predominantly Catholic countries (Guiso et al., 2003). The authors
rationalize this pattern by the anti-Jewish sentiments associated with Catholicism.
Influence of Different Religions
In order to examine how different religions influence individuals’ attitudes, Guiso
et al. (2003) interact religious behaviour with religious denomination. Seven reli-
gious groups are considered, namely Catholicism, Protestantism, Judaism, Islam,
Hinduism, Buddhism, and Others. The patterns of religious behaviour are the
same three measures of religious behaviour mentioned above, and their cumula-
tive effects. The authors also estimate the total impact of religion for the various
religious denominations.
According to the results of the estimation, religious Protestants tend to trust
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others. For Hindus, however, being religious has a mixed influence. For Muslims
the effect is null. Results also suggest that of the six religious denominations,
religiosity in Islam tends to have the strongest impact on intolerance. Moreover,
religious Catholics, Protestants, and Muslims tend to have conservative attitudes
towards women. By contrast, there is evidence that religiosity across the various
denominations tends to be associated with confidence in the government and the
legal system. With the exception of Buddhism, where the effect is statistically
not different from zero, religiosity is seen to be associated with the respect of legal
rules.
Guiso et al. (2003) find that religiosity in Islam, in general, tends to be as-
sociated with anti-market attitudes. In particular, Muslims raised religiously do
not think that large income differences work as incentive and they are in favour
of less competition. Furthermore, actively religious Muslims think that private
ownership should be decreased. Catholicism, on the other hand, is seen to foster
the opposite attitudes. Regarding the perceived fairness of the market, on average
religiosity in Christianity, Islam, and Hinduism is associated with the belief that
the poor live in need because they are lazy, not because of injustices in society.
Influence of Islam as a Dominant Religion
When Islam is the dominant religion it tends to foster intolerance towards others.
By contrast, Muslims tend to trust the government in both predominantly Mus-
lim and predominantly Protestant countries. Compared to Christian-majority
countries, Catholics tend to trust the government less when Islam is the domi-
nant religion. On the other hand, Hindus are found to be more trusting of the
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government in Muslim-majority countries. The effect in predominantly Christian
countries is null.
Religion is found to be associated with conservative attitudes towards women.
An interesting result, however, is the pattern revealed by the data when individu-
als are asked whether men should be prioritized when jobs are scarce. Catholicism,
Protestantism, and Islam tend to foster the attitude that men should be prioritized
among their respective followers when they are the dominant religions. Interest-
ingly, Jews tend to oppose such attitude only in Muslim-majority countries. The
effect in predominantly Christian countries is statistically not different from zero.
The findings of Guiso et al. (2003) suggest that Christians tend to respect the
law and trust the legal system more in predominantly Christian countries. How-
ever, Catholics are found to have less trust in the government when Islam is the
dominant religion. According to the results of the regression, Muslims consistently
trust the legal system regardless of the dominant religion. However, the impact
is stronger when Islam is the dominant religion. On the other hand, Muslims are
more willing to cheat on taxes in predominantly Muslim countries. However, the
effect is null when Christianity is the dominant religion.
Guiso et al. (2003) find that when Islam is the dominant religion, Muslims
tend to be associated with anti-market attitudes. In particular, they do not think
that larger income differences work as incentives, they tend to think that private
ownership should be decreased, and for those brought up religiously, competition
is not good. However, Muslims, like Christians and Hindus, tend to think that
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the poor are in need because they are lazy, rather than because of injustices in the
society. Finally, the results show that Islam in predominantly Muslim countries
tends to be associated with the attitude that thriftiness is a value that should be
taught to children.
The Second Vatican Council and Attitudes of Catholics
Between 1962 and 1965, the Vatican held a series of meetings known as the Sec-
ond Vatican Council to address matters related to the Catholic faith. The Council
resulted in major changes that affected the way Roman Catholics practice their
religion and the way they think of the followers of other faiths. For example, the
Vatican permitted the use of the vernacular instead of Latin in masses. Also, in a
document issued by the Council the leadership of the Catholic Church talks about
the followers of non-Christian faiths with a remarkably positive tone.
In order to test for whether the changes brought about by the Second Vatican
Council to the Catholic faith had an influence on Catholics’ attitudes, Guiso et al.
(2003) generate a dummy variable, coded 1 if the respondent is a Catholic born
after 1960, 0 otherwise. This dummy variable is included in the regression, and
interacted with three aspects of religiosity: raised Catholic, raised plus currently
Catholic, and raised plus currently Catholic plus actively Catholic.
Guiso et al. (2003) find that Catholics born after 1960 are more tolerant to-
wards other races and immigrants. They are also more trusting of others. This
result seems at odds with the negative association between Catholicism and trust
found in the literature. The authors rationalize the seemingly conflicting findings
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by arguing that there could be some “cultural characteristics that survive in coun-
tries imbued with Catholic culture, but do not exist any more in Catholic people.”1
With respect to attitudes towards women, there is evidence that Catholics
born after the Council are associated with more progressive views. Furthermore,
they tend to respect the law more than their older peers. However, they have
anti-market attitudes (e.g. they favour less private property, and think that com-
petition is bad), and tend to think that the poor are in need because of injustices
in the society, not because of laziness. Finally, post-Council Catholics are found
to be associated with the attitude that thriftiness is a value worth teaching to
children (Guiso et al., 2003).
Summary of the Review
The study of Guiso et al. (2003) examines the relationship between religion and
economically relevant attitudes. Specifically, it looks at the ways in which differ-
ent patterns of religious behaviour map onto different attitudes that are believed
to influence economic outcomes. Religious behaviour is measured by whether the
person is raised religiously, currently religious (i.e. attend services at least once
a year) and actively religious (i.e. attend services at least once a week). Eco-
nomically relevant attitudes are measured by opinions about issues believed to
influence economic outcomes. Examples are the level of trust an individual has
towards others, the respect of legal rules, and attitudes about the market.
The findings relative to Islam suggest that Muslims tend to be less tolerant
1Guiso et al. (2003), pp. 265, 280.
98
towards others and have conservative attitudes towards women. Islam does not
seem to have an influence on trust, however. The results also show that Muslims
are less willing to break the law and tend to have confidence in government. How-
ever, the effect is much stronger in countries where Islam or Protestantism are
the dominant religions. Moreover, Islam is seen to be correlated with anti-market
attitudes. “Overall, [findings suggest] that Christian religions are more positively
associated with attitudes conducive to economic growth, while religious Muslims
are the most anti-market.”1
However, the study of Guiso et al. (2003) has some limitations. The first re-
mark concerns the choice of the religiosity variables. The authors consider three
measures of religious behaviour, namely raised religiously, actively religious, and
currently religious. An individual is considered as actively religious if she or he at-
tends religious services once a week. However, currently religious means attending
religious services once a year. It is straightforward to notice the overlap between
actively religious and currently religious as defined by the authors. A person who
attends religious services once a week is actually actively religious and currently
religious. Furthermore, it is questionable whether attending religious services once
a year implies religiosity. It is possible that attending religious services reflects
compliance with certain social norms, rather than religious conviction. Hence, a
better measure of being religious is the answer to the WVS question whether the
respondent considers herself or himself religious.
One further remark about the composition of the sample is in order. In their
1Guiso et al. (2003), p. 228.
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paper Guiso et al. (2003) use a sample of individuals from countries that are pre-
dominantly Christian. Only three countries, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, and Turkey,
have predominately Muslim populations. Respondents who reported Islam as
their religion make less than 6 percent of the sample size. Hence, the question is
whether the findings of Guiso et al. (2003) with respect to Islam hold for a larger
sample.
3.3 Empirical Analysis
This chapter makes use of data collected by WVS on individuals from 17 predomi-
nantly Muslim countries. Seventeen dependent variables, gathered in six categories
of economically relevant attitudes, are selected. These categories are measures of
views towards the role of women in society; trusting others; confidence in state
institutions; respect of legal regulations; attitudes towards the market; and tol-
erance towards immigrants and people of different race and religion. It is worth
noting that the dependent variables are measures of opinions and intention rather
than actual behaviour. This, as Guiso et al. (2003) explain, reduces the influence
of spurious factors. “Asking somebody his view on cheating on taxes is different
from asking him if he has cheated on his taxes. The decision of whether to actually
cheat is affected greatly by the probability of being caught. This is a function of
a country’s law enforcement, not of an individual’s attitude. Therefore, looking
at attitudes is a better way of identifying the effect of religious beliefs on peo-
ple’s preferences.”1 Table (3.1) provides a summary statistics of the dependent
variables.
1Guiso et al. (2003), pp. 231-32.
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The first group of variables is about attitudes towards women. The findings
of the first chapter suggest that more progressive attitudes towards the role of
women in society lead to better FDI performance. The second category is about
trust. Trust is believed to have an influence on economic performance (Guiso
et al., 2009; Algan and Cahuc, 2010) and institutions (La Porta et al., 1997).
The third and the fourth categories of attitudes include variables measuring con-
fidence in state institutions and respect of legal regulations. The findings of the
empirical literature show that corruption, for example, is deleterious to economic
growth (Mauro, 1995; Mo, 2001, for example). The fifth category measures atti-
tudes about the market. Arguing in favour of the free market model, Easton and
Walker (1997) observe that a freer economic structure stimulates growth. Never-
theless, some authors argue that in some cases a higher level of state intervention is
desirable. For example, Amsden (1992) argues that late-industrializing countries,
such as South Korea, provide evidence for the positive role of the state in driv-
ing economic growth. In this sense, it is possible that pro-market attitudes have
the reverse effect on growth for predominantly Muslim countries. Category six
includes variables measuring tolerance towards immigrants and individuals from
different religious and racial backgrounds. Landes (1998) argues that the intol-
erant Catholic Inquisition led many of the skilled people to leave. “[The Jews]
took with them money, commercial know-how, connections, knowledge, and –
even more serious – those immeasurable qualities of curiosity and dissent that are
the leaven of thought.”1 Moreover, the findings of the first chapter suggest that
countries enjoying higher levels of external cultural openness are more attractive
to foreign investors. As shown in Table (3.1), all variables are coded in a way that
1Landes (1998), p. 134.
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a higher value refers to a higher level of agreement.
The 17 dependent variables are regressed on measures of religious behaviour.
The explanatory variables measuring religiosity I use are those found to be statis-
tically significant in chapter two. These variables are the belief in the importance
of God in life (1 to 10, with the value 10 being very important), the belief in the
importance of religion in life (1 to 4, with 4 being very important), and attending
formal religious services once a week (yes = 1, 0 otherwise). I also consider a
measure of disbelief, namely whether the respondent is an atheist.
Following Guiso et al. (2003) I control for individual characteristics. The con-
trol variables are a subjective measure of the state of health ranging from 1 being
very poor to 5 being very good; a dummy variable for gender that takes the value
1 if the respondent is a woman, 0 otherwise; the actual age of the respondent;
a measure of educational attainment ranging from 1 to 8 with the lowest level
being “inadequately completed elementary education” and the highest level being
a university graduate; and a measure of income level (10 steps, with 1 being the
lowest step and 10 being the highest step). With the exception of gender, the
variables are coded in a way that a higher value refers to a higher state.
Shi’ism and Sunnism are the largest denominations of Islam, with Sunnis repre-
senting around 90 percent of world Muslims. Shi’ites are concentrated in four coun-
tries, namely Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Iran, and Iraq. Historically Shi’ism emerged
as a result of a disagreement over political power, but underpinned by a religious
dimension. Upon the death of Mohamed, a group of people, who would later
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become known as Shi’a1 (Shi’ite in English language), favoured Ali, Mohamed’s
cousin and son in law, for the leadership of Muslims. However, Abu Bakr was
chosen for the position. Politically defeated, the supporters of Ali would not give
up. They would make use of the Islamic scriptures and interpret them in a way to
promote Ali as a man with supernatural, almost divine, qualities. After the death
of Imam Ali,2 the interpretation effort that sought to promote him as a perfect
leader did not wither away. It carried on with other Imams. Ali and eleven Imams
together are the twelve historical Imams who Shi’ites refer to in religious matters.
For Sunnis, while Ali is a respected figure in Islam he does not have any privileged
status, let alone supernatural qualities.
Over the centuries as differences between Sunnism and Shi’ism built up, the
two denominations of Islam drifted apart to form two different systems of beliefs.
Since this chapter examines how different levels of religiosity map onto economi-
cally meaningful attitudes in predominantly Muslim societies, it is interesting to
see whether theological differences between Sunnism and Shi’ism play any role in
shaping people’s attitudes.
The WVS database does not provide data on whether the Muslim respondent
is Sunni or Shi’ite. However, it offers data on three predominantly Shi’ite coun-
tries, namely Azerbaijan, Iran, and Iraq. This gives the opportunity to examine
how religious behaviour in Sunni-majority countries map onto economically rele-
vant attitudes compared to Shi’ite-majority countries.
1Shi’a is Arabic for followers.
2In Sunni Islam, the person who leads the prayers is called an Imam. However, in Shi’ism
Imam is a title reserved to Ali and eleven of his male descendants. It is worth noting that
Khomeini made an exception and was referred to by his supporters as Imam.
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Although the dependent variables are measures of opinions and not actual
behaviour, which helps reducing spurious correlations (Guiso et al., 2003), the
estimated coefficients should not be interpreted as cause-effect relationships, but
rather as correlations. The reason is that, as Guiso et al. (2003) explain, there
could be some latent variable that influences both religiosity and the attitudes
individuals have.
3.4 Results and Discussion
Table (3.2) reports the results relative to the sample of individuals from predom-
inantly Sunni countries. The table consists of three panels – A, B, and C – each
reports the results relative to a set of dependent variables. Each dependent vari-
able, shown in the top row of each panel, is regressed on four variables measuring
attendance and the intensity of religious belief, along with other controls. The
regression is replicated for a sample of individuals from predominantly Shi’ite
countries, and the results of the regression are reported in Panels A through to
C of Table (3.3). In order to respect the ordinality of the dependent variables, I
follow Daykin and Moffatt (2002) and use the ordered probit regression technique.
For technical reasons related to the presentation of the results, I follow Guiso
et al. (2003) and discuss the results in terms of the “influence” of the independent
variable on the dependent variable. However, as already mentioned, the rela-
tionship between the independent variable and the dependent variable should be
understood as a correlation.
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According to the results of the estimation, older individuals in both Sunni-
majority and Shi’ite-majority countries tend to have conservative attitudes to-
wards the role of women in society. By contrast, education and wealth are seen
to foster progressive attitudes. As expected, women are strongly opposed to the
limitation of their rights. Surprisingly, women in Shi’ite-majority countries dis-
agree with their peers in Sunni-majority countries in that they hold the belief that
being a housewife is as fulfilling as working for pay. The bulk of the Shi’ite sample
consists of individuals from Iran and Iraq, and it is possible that the apparent
contentment with the role of a housewife in Shi’ite-majority countries is rather an
expression of the state of uncertainty created by the political and economic up-
heavals these countries know. Compared to men, women are found to have more
confidence in state institutions, and they are more willing to respect legal rules.
Overall, the influence of age, education, and gender on attitudes towards women
in predominantly Muslim countries is similar to that found by Guiso et al. (2003).
In agreement with the findings of Guiso et al. (2003), the empirical results
suggest that older individuals in both groups of countries have, ceteris paribus, a
higher propensity to trust others compared to their younger peers. On the other
hand, individuals with higher educational attainment tend to distrust others, have
less confidence in state institutions, and they are more willing to break legal regu-
lations. In the study of Guiso et al. (2003), education is also found to discourage
confidence in state institutions. Interestingly, while income is found to foster con-
fidence in state institutions in predominantly Shi’ite countries, it tends to have
the opposite impact in predominantly Sunni countries. Regarding the respect of
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law, income in predominantly Muslim countries (both Sunni and Shi’ite) tends to
have the same impact as in predominantly Christian countries: richer individuals
are more willing to break the law.
With respect to the market, the results of the regression indicate that women
in predominantly Muslim countries, like their peers in predominantly Christian
countries (Guiso et al., 2003), tend to have anti-market attitudes. In particular
they do not think that competition is good, and think that private property should
be decreased. In agreement with the findings of Guiso et al. (2003), education is
found to encourage pro-market attitudes.
Regarding attitudes towards immigrants and individuals from different reli-
gious and ethnic backgrounds, the results of the regression suggest that age, ed-
ucation, and wealth tend to be associated with tolerance towards foreigners in
Sunni-majority countries. Compared to men, women in predominantly Shi’ite
countries are more tolerant towards immigrants and individuals of different reli-
gions.
Now we turn our attention to the influence of religion. The empirical find-
ings reported in Tables (3.2) and (3.3) suggest that religiosity in predominantly
Muslim countries, measured by the belief in the importance of God and religion
in life, and temple attendance, has an influence on economically relevant attitudes.
According to the results of the regression, individuals who believe in the im-
portance of religion in life in both predominantly Sunni and predominantly Shi’ite
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countries tend to be the most conservative. For example, they think that uni-
versity is more important for boys, and that being a housewife is as fulfilling as
working for pay. Interestingly, in predominantly Sunni countries, regular temple
goers tend to have progressive attitudes towards the role of women in society:
they disagree with the statement that men make better politicians than women,
and do not think that being a housewife is as fulfilling as working for pay.
In Sunni-majority countries the belief in the importance of religion in life is
found to discourage trust. However, in predominantly Shi’ite countries the neg-
ative influence on trust comes from the belief in the importance of God in life.
Regarding attitudes towards institutions and legal rules, the results of the regres-
sion suggest that religiosity tends to encourage confidence in state institutions and
the respect of law. By contrast, there are indications that atheists in predomi-
nantly Shi’ite countries are more willing to break the law.
Panel C in Tables (3.2) and (3.3) reports the results relative to the attitudes
towards the market and tolerance towards others. In Sunni-majority countries
belief and attendance, in general, are found to foster pro-market attitudes. Athe-
ism, on the other hand is associated with anti-market attitudes. In predominantly
Shi’ite countries, however, religiosity has a mixed influence on attitudes towards
the market. These findings are in disagreement with Guiso et al. (2003) who find
that Muslims tend to have anti-market attitudes.
With respect to attitudes towards others, the influence of religiosity in predom-
inantly Sunni countries is much stronger than in predominantly Shi’ite countries.
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Individuals from Sunni-majority countries who believe that God and religion are
important in life tend to be intolerant towards immigrants and people from dif-
ferent religious and ethnic backgrounds. Regular temple attendance, by contrast,
tends to foster the opposite attitudes. Except for attending religious services which
is found to encourage tolerance towards others, my findings with respect to the in-
fluence of religiosity on tolerance are in agreement with those of Guiso et al. (2003).
In summary, in both predominantly Sunni and predominantly Shi’ite coun-
tries conservative attitudes towards women tend to be associated with individ-
uals who believe in the importance of God and religion in life. Religious belief
and attendance increase confidence in state institutions. Religious beliefs, but
not attendance (insignificant), are found to encourage the respect of legal rules.
With respect to the market, religiosity is associated with pro-market attitudes in
Sunni-majority countries. In Shi’ite-majority countries, believing in the impor-
tance of God and religion in life tends to encourage anti-market attitudes. In
Sunni-majority countries, while religious beliefs are associated with intolerance
towards immigrants and people of different race and religion, temple attendance
encourages the opposite attitude. It is possible that the positive association be-
tween attending services and tolerance towards strangers is due to the role played
by houses of worship as social clubs. Congregations offer an opportunity for indi-
viduals to meet and to know each other. This in turn eases communication and
can help removing prejudices towards strangers. It is equally plausible to argue
that the acceptance of strangers is due to the positive influence of the clergy.
Table (3.4) provides a summary of the findings with respect to the influence of
belief and attendance on individual attitudes in predominantly Sunni and pre-
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dominantly Shi’ite countries.
The findings of this chapter are consistent with those of the previous chapters.
In chapter one, I find that higher levels of religious commitment map onto lower
degrees of openness, both internal and external. I also find that lower degrees
of internal openness and external cultural openness are associated with poor FDI
performance. In chapter two, the empirical findings suggest that higher levels of
religious intensity, measured by the belief in the importance of God and religion
in life, lead to lower rates of economic growth. The empirical results of this chap-
ter suggest that the negative attitudes towards the role of women in society and
intolerance towards strangers are plausible channels through which the negative
influence of religion on economic growth works.
However, religion in predominantly Muslim countries (i.e. Sunni-majority
countries) is found to foster the type of attitudes that are believed to be con-
ducive to economic growth. In particular, religiosity is associated with confidence
in state institutions and the respect of law. Religion is also found to be associated
with pro-market attitudes.
The findings of this chapter suggest that religion in predominantly Muslim so-
cieties produces both type of attitudes: plausibly pro-growth attitudes and anti-
growth attitudes. The empirical findings of chapter two show that religion has a
deleterious effect on economic growth. This suggests that the anti-growth atti-
tudes outweigh the pro-growth attitudes. An interesting question, then, is whether
the conservative attitudes towards women and intolerance towards foreigners ac-
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count for the entirety of the negative effect of religion on economic growth.
The “excessive enthusiasm” produced by religion about the market is another
plausible channel through which the negative influence of religion on growth works.
It is possible that a higher degree of state intervention is desirable in predomi-
nantly Muslim countries. The experience of the late-industrializing countries such
as South Korea and Singapore lends support to this argument. Studying the role of
the state in South Korea’s industrialization, Amsden (1992) argues that “[South]
Korea is evidence for the proposition that if and when late industrialization ar-
rives, the driving force behind it is a strong interventionist state.”1 According to
the data reported by the author, the growth rate of GNP of South Korea averaged
9.1 percent over a period of 17 years, starting in 1963–the year the state adopted
a planning strategy (Amsden, 1992). Similarly, Chew and Lee (1991) document
the heavy involvement of the state in the industrialization of the economy. The
authors observe that “[the] strong government backing, efforts by the [Economic
Development Board] to attract new industries and encourage expansion of estab-
lished ones bore fruits.”2 According to Singaporean statisticians, real GDP per
capita has increased by about three folds over a period of 17 years. It increased
from $1,400 in 1960 to $4,413 in 1977. In 2012, GDP per capita in Singapore stood
at $33,530. In other late-industrializing countries such as Japan and Taiwan the
state also played a central role in stimulating economic development (Amsden,
1992).
1Amsden (1992), p. 55.
2Chew and Lee (1991), p. 192.
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3.4.1 Attitudes in Islam and Christianity
Is the influence of religiosity in Muslim-majority countries different from its in-
fluence in predominantly Christian countries? Before proceeding, I should note
that in the following discussion I contrast the findings of Guiso et al. (2003) to my
own findings relative to the Sunni sample. Sunnis represent the majority of the
world’s Muslims (about 90 percent). Hence, in what follows Sunnis are referred
to as Muslims.
According to the findings of Guiso et al. (2003), in predominantly Christian
countries religiosity is strongly associated with negative views towards the role
of women in society. My findings, on the other hand, partly agree with those of
Guiso and his colleagues. In predominantly Muslim countries, while believing in
the importance of God and religion in life fosters conservatism towards women,
attending religious services is found to be associated with the opposite attitudes.
Religiosity (i.e. belief and attendance) in predominantly Christian countries en-
courages the formation of trust (Guiso et al., 2003), whereas it tends to encourage
distrust in predominantly Muslim countries. With respect to attitudes towards
immigrants and individuals from different backgrounds, my findings partly agree
with those of Guiso et al. (2003). Like in predominantly Christian countries, re-
ligious belief in Muslim-majority countries is found to foster intolerance towards
strangers. On the other hand, while temple attendance tends to be associated
with intolerance towards strangers in predominantly Christian countries, it is seen
to encourage the opposite attitude in Muslim-majority countries.
Guiso et al. (2003) find that religiosity in predominantly Christian countries
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tends to encourage confidence in state institutions and the respect of law. In agree-
ment with these results, I find that religiosity in predominantly Muslim countries
has the same impact. With respect to the attitudes towards the market, athe-
ists in Muslim-majority countries, like their peers in Christian-majority countries,
tend to have anti-market attitudes. By contrast, individuals who believe that God
and religion are important in life tend to be in favour of more competition, and
think that larger income differences work as incentives. These results do not lend
support to the argument of Guiso et al. (2003) who conclude that Muslims tend
to have anti-market attitudes.
3.4.2 September 11 and Religiosity
Is religiosity stable over time? Barro and McCleary (2003) and McCleary and
Barro (2006) assume that religious behaviour is persistent over time and compile
their data on religious belief and attendance on the basis of that assumption. The
findings of the empirical literature, however, suggest that religious behaviour is
subject to change, depending on political and social circumstances. Studying the
religious behaviour of Iranians before and after 1979, Kazemipur and Rezaei (2003)
find that in pre-1979 Iran, the opposition to the secularization campaign took the
form of manifesting more religiosity. Later, however, the Iranians opposed the
Islamization of the state and the society (i.e. de-secularization) by expressing less
religiosity.
The attacks of September 11 is a major event that had serious repercussions
for Muslims. Ever since the attacks, Islamophobia has increased (Sheridan, 2006)
and Islam has been associated with terrorism and even fascism. Maalouf (1998)
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argues that people tend to emphasize the dimension of their identity that they
feel is most threatened. According to this argument, one would expect Muslims
to be more religious after 2001.
The WVS dataset provides the opportunity to test for whether religiosity in
predominantly Muslim countries has increased after September 11. To test for
this hypothesis, I consider a sample of individuals from predominantly Muslim
countries who report Islam as their religion. Each country is observed once in
2000-2001, then once again in 2006-2008. The list of countries is reported in Ap-
pendix C. To control for the influence of September 11 on religious behaviour, a
dummy variable is generated. This variable takes the value 1 if the year is 2006-
2008, 0 if the year is 2000-2001. Five measures of religious behaviour are regressed
on the dummy September 11 and an array of variables controlling for individual
characteristics.
According to the results of the regression reported in Table (3.5), Muslims
are more religious after September 11. In particular, in 2006-2008 there are more
people who think that God and religion are important in life than in 2000-2001.
Moreover, there are more people attending religious services more than once a
week in 2006-2008 compared to 2000-2001. These results do not lend support to
the assumption of McCleary and Barro that religious behaviour is persistent over
time.
Economically, the increase in religiosity after September 11 might have nega-
tive consequences. In the previous chapters the empirical findings show that higher
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levels of religiosity are associated with lower degrees of openness (internal and ex-
ternal), and that lower degrees of openness lead to lower levels of FDI. Results
also show that higher levels of religiosity map onto lower rates of economic growth,
suggesting a net negative influence of religion on economically relevant attitudes.
Hence, the increase in religiosity caused by September 11, ceteris paribus, could
plausibly mean that countries with substantial Muslim presence would become
even less attractive to FDI and their growth performance would worsen.
Table 3.5: September 11 and Selected Measures of Religious Behaviour
Religion is God is Once More than
Atheist important important a week once a week
State of health -0.074 0.013 0.065** 0.014 0.029*
(0.070) (0.017) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015)
Gender (woman) -0.168 0.127** 0.106** -0.512** -0.747**
(0.117) (0.028) (0.026) (0.024) (0.025)
Age -0.010* 0.004** 0.004** -0.001 0.012**
(0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Education -0.004 -0.057** -0.035** 0.000 -0.011*
(0.029) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006)
Income level 0.001 -0.027** -0.036** -0.003 -0.007
(0.033) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006)
September 11 -3.561 0.877** 0.974** 0.030 0.284**
(223.594) (0.049) (0.052) (0.038) (0.039)
Pseudo-R2 0.160 0.088 0.055 0.074 0.122
Number of observations 16,929 16,889 16,879 16,929 16,929
Notes: Ordered probit regressions. All regressions include dummies for countries and the
survey year. The standard errors reported in parentheses. The symbols ** and * mean
that the coefficient is statistically significant at the 1 and 5 percent level, respectively.
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3.5 Concluding Remarks
This chapter has studied how different patterns of religious behaviour in predom-
inantly Muslim countries map onto economically relevant attitudes. Seventeen
variables measuring individual opinions and views on economic matters are re-
gressed on four measures of religious behaviour for a sample of individuals from
Sunni-majority countries. The exercise is replicated for a sample of individuals
from predominantly Shi’ite countries.
The empirical findings tentatively suggest that there are more similarities than
differences between the way religiosity influences attitudes in predominantly Sunni
countries and predominantly Shi’ite countries. Religious belief in predominantly
Muslim countries is found to encourage negative attitudes towards the role of
women in society. Religiosity tends to encourage distrust, and intolerance to-
wards immigrants and individuals from different religious and racial backgrounds.
On the other hand, religiosity is seen to foster confidence in state institutions and
the respect of law. It is also found to encourage pro-market attitudes.
The positive association between religion and conservative attitudes towards
women and intolerance towards immigrants and strangers found in this chapter is
consistent with my findings in the previous chapters. In chapter one, the empirical
results suggest that conservatism towards the role of women in society and less
openness to outsiders map onto poor FDI performance. The negative attitudes
towards women and intolerance towards strangers could also explain the negative
influence of religion on economic growth found in the second chapter of this dis-
sertation.
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Nonetheless, religiosity is associated with the type of attitudes that are believed
to be conducive to growth. The results of the regression suggest that religiosity
tends to foster confidence in state institutions and the respect of law. More-
over, religiosity in predominantly Sunni countries is associated with pro-market
attitudes. My findings with respect to the attitudes towards the market are in
disagreement with Guiso et al. (2003) who find that Muslims are associated with
anti-competition and anti-market attitudes.
Although it is hard to conceive how the positive attitudes towards institu-
tions and legal regulations negatively affect economic growth, it is possible that
the pro-market attitudes have a negative influence on growth. All predominantly
Muslim countries are not industrialized and they are classified as developing by
international organization (e.g. United Nations). Thus, a higher degree of state
intervention is perhaps desirable. The experience of late-industrializing countries,
such as South Korea (Amsden, 1992) and Singapore (Chew and Lee, 1991), pro-
vides support to the state-intervention argument.
Finally, there is evidence that after the event of September 11 Muslims are more
religious. If more religiosity would map onto more conservatism towards women
and more intolerance towards strangers, then, ceteris paribus, one would expect
predominantly Muslim countries to be even less attractive to FDI. Moreover, since
countries with high levels of religiosity are associated with low rates of economic
growth, then September 11 by increasing religious intensity would lead to even
worse economic performance.
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Conclusion
This dissertation has studied the influence of religiosity on macroeconomic per-
formance in countries with substantial Muslim presence. In chapter one I studied
the influence of religiously motivated attitudes on FDI. In chapter two I examined
the influence of religiosity, gauged by belief and attendance, on economic growth.
Chapter three looks at how different patterns of religious behaviour map onto
economically relevant attitudes.
Using instrumental variable techniques, in chapter one I show that countries
with higher degrees of openness towards foreigners and progressive views towards
women tend to be more attractive to foreign direct investors. In chapter two,
the empirical findings suggest that higher levels of religious intensity and atten-
dance are associated with lower rates of economic growth. In chapter three of the
dissertation, empirical findings tentatively suggest that in predominantly Muslim
countries religiosity is associated with conservative attitudes towards women and
intolerance towards strangers. By contrast, religiosity is seen to encourage confi-
dence in state institutions, and the respect of legal regulations. Also, I find that
religiosity in Muslim-majority countries tends to foster pro-market attitudes. This
result is in disagreement with Guiso et al. (2003) who conclude that Muslims have
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anti-market attitudes. Finally, there is evidence that Muslims are more religious
after September 11. This result shows that religious expression is not stable over
time and that political and social events could have an influence on religious be-
haviour.
The findings of chapter three are consistent with those of chapters two and
three. Conservatism towards women and intolerance towards foreigners are found
to be positively associated with religiosity. In chapter one I show that these at-
titudes lead to lower FDI performance. The negative attitudes towards women
and people from different cultural backgrounds are also plausible channels through
which the negative influence of religion on economic growth works.
Another possible channel through which the deleterious effect of religion on
growth works is the “excessive enthusiasm” about the market. The experience of
the late-industrializing countries such as South Korea and Singapore suggests that
a higher degree of state intervention is desirable. Studying South Korea as a case
of a late-industrializing country, Amsden (1992) argues that “when late industri-
alization arrives, the driving force behind it is a strong interventionist state.”1
There are indications that ever since September 11, there is a feeling in predom-
inantly Muslim countries that Islam is targeted. Muslims have been associated
with terrorism and even fascism. Retaliating to the alleged attack, Muslims are
reportedly more religious. In agreement with the findings of the literature, I find
that Muslims are more religious after September 11.
1Amsden (1992), p. 55.
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Given the negative influence of religiosity on economic performance suggested
by the findings of chapters two and three, the increase in religiosity caused by
September 11, ceteris paribus, could plausibly mean that countries with substan-
tial Muslim presence would become even less attractive to foreign investors, and
their performance in terms of economic growth would worsen.
To sum up, this dissertation has found that religion in countries with sub-
stantial Muslim presence negatively influences FDI performance by encouraging
negative attitudes towards the role of women in society, and intolerance towards
strangers. These attitudes, along with the “excessive enthusiasm” about the mar-
ket are plausible channels through which the negative influence of religion on
growth works. The increase of religiosity after September 11, ceteris paribus,
plausibly suggests that the economic performance, gauged by FDI and economic
growth, of countries with substantial Muslim presence would even worsen.
There are a number of interesting directions for future research. The findings of
this dissertation suggest that religious engagement in predominantly Muslim coun-
tries encourages negative attitudes towards the role of women in society. Hence,
an interesting question is whether this is specific to Islam. In other words, does
Islam intrinsically promote negative attitudes towards women? Another question
that follows is whether Islam differs in its views towards the role of women in
society from other religions such as Judaism and Catholicism where the sense of
orthodoxy is relatively strong.
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In this dissertation I examined the influence of religion in countries with sub-
stantial Muslim presence on FDI and economic growth. It is interesting to extend
the investigation to other domains of economic activity. It is also interesting to
consider the influence of religion on bilateral economic activities such as bilateral
trade. Another interesting direction for future research is motivated by the politi-
cal changes taking place in a number of Arab countries. The wave of protests that
started in Tunisia towards the end of the year 2010 and spread out to other Arab
countries, brought conservative Islamist governments to power. The ultimate goal
of political Islam is the establishment of a society governed by the teachings of
Islam. One economic sector that might be affected is tourism. The question that
arises, then, is what would be the effect of the rise of political Islam on tourism.
My findings with respect to the relationship between free market and eco-
nomic development suggest that more research into the nature of the relationship
between the two is required. According to the mainstream view liberalized insti-
tutions along the lines of the Anglo-American model are the good institutions and
they are the root cause of good economic performance (Chang, 2011). In his paper
Chang (2011) challenges this view on theoretical and empirical grounds. For ex-
ample, he documents that rich countries performed better when institutions were
less liberalized. During the period from 1945 to the late 1970s “[the rich capitalist
countries] grew three to four times faster than during the period of classical liber-
alism (1820-1950) and twice faster than during the subsequent neo-liberal period
(1980–2009).”1
1Chang (2011), p. 484.
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Appendix A (Chapter 1)
The sample used in chapter two consists of 37 countries. Nineteen Arab countries,
10 Asian countries, 2 European countries, and 7 countries located in Sub-Saharan
Africa.
Table A1: The Sample of Countries
Arab Asian European Sub-Saharan
countries countries countries Africa
Algeria Uzbekistan Albania Chad
Bahrain Azerbaijan Turkey Gambia
Comoros Bangladesh Guinea
Djibouti Indonesia Mali
Egypt Iran Niger
Jordan Kyrgyzstan Senegal
Kuwait Malaysia Sierra Leone
Lebanon Pakistan
Libya Tajikistan
Mauritania Turkmenistan
Morocco
Oman
Saudi Arabia
Sudan
Syria
Tunisia
U.A. Emirates
Yemen
Notes: The share of the population adhering to Islam in these
countries is greater than 50 percent.
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Table A2: Hausman Test
β α β − α
IV GLS Difference
Internal openness 0.102 0.012 0.090
External cultural openness 0.007 0.000 0.008
GDP (logged) 0.218 0.309 -0.091
Government consumption 0.052 0.035 0.017
Trade openness 0.007 0.016 -0.009
Infrastructure 0.062 0.044 0.018
Health -0.008 0.007 -0.015
Oil/gas exporter -0.579 -0.568 -0.011
Democracy index -0.048 -0.072 0.024
Muslim share -0.028 -0.038 0.010
Arab country 1.190 1.177 0.013
Notes: β = consistent under H0 and H1; obtained from the
G2SLS IV regression.
α = inconsistent under H1, efficient under H0; obtained
from the GLS regression.
Test: H0 = difference in coefficients not systematic.
χ2(11) = 22.64, Prob > χ2 = 0.0199.
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Table A3: First Stage of G2SLS IV Regression
Internal External
openness openness
GDP (logged) 0.926* -13.784**
(0.537) (4.195)
Government consumption -0.061 -1.705*
(0.099) (0.773)
Trade openness 0.052** 0.489**
(0.015) (0.117)
Infrastructure -0.220* 1.374
(0.100) (0.778)
Health 0.184** 0.165
(0.029) (0.224)
Oil/gas exporter 2.600 -8.758
(1.923) (15.016)
Democracy index -0.204 0.160
(0.158) (1.231)
Muslim share 0.198 2.040
(0.142) (1.107)
Arab country 0.921 -0.583
(4.330) (33.816)
Ratio of cost line to borders -0.021 1.857**
(0.044) (0.341)
State religion -3.540 61.012**
(2.852) (22.272)
Distance from Mecca 0.000 -0.011*
(0.001) (0.005)
Religious pluralism 13.015 149.578*
(8.385) (65.482)
Sub-Saharan Africa 8.242 79.513*
(5.079) (39.663)
Asia 0.771 -16.005
(4.813) (37.584)
Arabian peninsula -9.516** 14.657
(3.545) (27.682)
Wald χ2 86** 156**
Number of observations 315 315
Notes: For space considerations, the coefficient on the
intercept is not shown. The standard errors reported
in parentheses. The symbols ** and * mean that the
coefficient is statistically significant at the 1 and 5 per-
cent level, respectively.
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Appendix B (Chapter 2)
The sample used in chapter three consists of 27 countries. The geographical dis-
tribution of the countries is as follows: 5 Arab countries, 9 Asian countries, 6
countries are located in Europe, and 7 Sub-Saharan African countries.
Table B1: The Sample of Countries
Arab Asian European Sub-Saharan
countries countries countries Africa
Algeria Azerbaijan Albania Burkina Faso
Egypt Bangladesh Bulgaria Ethiopia
Jordan India Cyprus Ghana
Morocco Indonesia Georgia Mali
Saudi Arabia Iran Russia Nigeria
Kyrgyzstan Turkey Tanzania
Malaysia Uganda
Pakistan
Singapore
Notes: The share of the population adhering to Islam in these
countries ≥ 10 percent. Countries with a Muslim share of the
population of 50 percent or higher represent 63 percent of the
sample.
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Table B2: Religiosity and Economic Growth
Growth rate (1) (2) (3)
Intercept 10.343* 11.733** 10.966**
(4.707) (4.169) (3.888)
Initial GDP per capita -1.384 -0.923 -0.862
(0.819) (0.516) (0.509)
Investment 0.034 0.096 0.106
(0.096) (0.060) (0.059)
Inflation -0.028** -0.030** -0.031**
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005)
Trade openness 0.001 0 -0.003
(0.011) (0.009) (0.010)
R&D 0.012 0.002 0.003
(0.015) (0.005) (0.005)
Democracy index 0.147 0.01 -0.021
(0.249) (0.123) (0.127)
Attendance (once a week) -0.065 -0.021 -0.008
(0.049) (0.030) (0.031)
Belief Religious Religion is God is
person important important
0.061 -0.059 -0.042
(0.093) (0.103) (0.041)
Muslim share 0.001 0.003 0.009
(0.014) (0.014) (0.015)
Arab country 0.423 -0.109 0.015
(1.596) (1.126) (1.122)
Wald χ2(10) 38.16** 52.35** 54.30**
Number of Observations 50 50 50
Number of Countries 27 27 27
Notes: G2SLS IV regressions. The instrumented variables are the
attendance and belief variables. The instruments are a dummy
variable for Soviet past; a measure of religious pluralism; the dis-
tance in kilometres between the capital city and Mecca, Saudi
Arabia; dummy variables for the three geographic locations Asia,
Europe, and Sub-Saharan Africa. The standard errors reported in
parentheses. The symbols ** and * mean that the coefficient is
statistically significant at the 1 and 5 percent level, respectively.
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Table B3: First Stage of G2SLS IV Regression
Attendance Religious Religion is God is
(one a week) person important important
Intercept 66.399 71.915 39.647** 59.857
(42.772) (60.525) (12.371) (38.803)
Initial GDP per capita -7.686 -1.940 -1.644 -1.074
(5.477) (7.750) (1.584) (4.969)
Investment -0.481 0.623 0.246 0.321
(0.508) (0.719) (0.147) (0.461)
Inflation 0.005 -0.008 -0.026* -0.035
(0.037) (0.052) (0.011) (0.034)
Trade openness -0.114 0.006 0.000 -0.131
(0.097) (0.137) (0.028) (0.088)
R & D 0.042 -0.133** -0.012 0.005
(0.036) (0.051) (0.010) (0.033)
Democracy index -1.256 -3.275 -0.303 -1.252
(1.295) (1.832) (0.374) (1.174)
Muslim share -0.041 -0.039 0.117** 0.273*
(0.129) (0.182) (0.037) (0.117)
Arab country 36.426* 8.228 4.233 10.849
(14.638) (20.714) (4.234) (13.280)
Distance from Mecca 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002)
Soviet past -31.466* -30.530 -17.469** -37.293**
(13.196) (18.673) (3.817) (11.972)
Asia 39.790** 23.151 1.464 6.155
(14.188) (20.077) (4.104) (12.871)
Europe 46.807* 38.532 6.394 4.917
(22.171) (31.373) (6.413) (20.113)
Sub-Saharan Africa 69.846** 24.699 0.704 7.560
(17.781) (25.162) (5.143) (16.132)
Religious pluralism -15.872 10.066 15.899* 24.933
(23.770) (33.637) (6.875) (21.565)
Wald χ2(14) 134** 34** 206** 154**
Number of Observations 50 50 50 50
Number of Countries 27 27 27 27
Notes: The standard errors reported in parentheses. The symbols ** and *
mean that the coefficient is statistically significant at the 1 and 5 percent level,
respectively.
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Table B4: G2SLS IV Regression
for the Sub-Sample of Countries Observed Twice
Growth (1) (2) (3) (4)
Intercept -14.717* -11.263 18.221 26.576
(5.785) (10.114) (25.565) (27.218)
Initial GDP per capita 2.215** 1.672 -1.001 -1.598
(0.724) (0.964) (2.384) (2.404)
Investment 0.091 0.048 0.168 0.137
(0.057) (0.089) (0.108) (0.080)
Inflation 0.114** 0.087* 0.047 -0.013
(0.040) (0.042) (0.050) (0.083)
Trade openness -0.033** -0.028* 0.009 0.026
(0.010) (0.012) (0.036) (0.042)
R&D -0.02 -0.005 0.006 0.012
(0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.022)
Democracy index -0.051 0.026 -0.124 -0.205
(0.115) (0.208) (0.144) (0.178)
Attendance (once a week) 0.033
(0.017)
Belief Religious Religion is God is
person important important
0.017 -0.098 -0.138
(0.036) (0.099) (0.111)
Muslim share -0.021 -0.004 -0.024 -0.011
(0.013) (0.025) (0.017) (0.014)
Arab country 0.524 0.174 0.291 -0.377
(0.784) (0.801) (0.843) (0.947)
Wald χ2(9) 41.05** 34.09** 32.30** 30.58**
Number of Observations 18 18 18 18
Number of Countries 9 9 9 9
Notes: The standard errors reported in parentheses. The symbols ** and
* mean that the coefficient is statistically significant at the 1 and 5 percent
level, respectively.
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Table B5: G2SLS IV Regression
for the Sub-Sample of Countries Observed Four Times
Growth (1) (2) (3) (4)
Intercept 18.703 1.297 -5.248 6.226
(44.471) (15.728) (28.941) (15.392)
Initial GDP per capita -3.271 -0.99 -0.035 -1.583
(6.182) (2.700) (4.194) (2.582)
Investment -0.121 -0.191 -0.189 -0.161
(0.184) (0.166) (0.148) (0.133)
Inflation -0.025** -0.026** -0.024** -0.025**
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005)
Trade openness 0.109* 0.096 0.079 0.103
(0.055) (0.063) (0.078) (0.055)
R&D -0.001 -0.005 -0.008 -0.004
(0.030) (0.035) (0.031) (0.029)
Democracy index 1.576 1.706 1.413 1.633
(0.813) (1.010) (1.009) (0.836)
Attendance (once a week) -0.073
(0.247)
Religious Religion is God is
Belief person important important
0.021 0.061 -0.001
(0.044) (0.146) (0.047)
Muslim share 0.068 0.009 -0.026 0.028
(0.148) (0.063) (0.133) (0.069)
Wald χ2(8) 71.17** 44.78** 60.22** 63.65**
Number of Observations 16 16 16 16
Number of Countries 4 4 4 4
Notes: The dummy Arab country is dropped from the regression because none
of the countries of the sub-sample is an Arab country. The standard errors
reported in parentheses. The symbols ** and * mean that the coefficient is
statistically significant at the 1 and 5 percent level, respectively.
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Appendix C (Chapter 3)
The samples of individual observations used in chapter four are collected from 17
countries, three of them are predominantly Shi’ite and the rest are predominantly
Sunni. Table (C1), below, gives the list of the countries by dominant Islamic faith.
The symbol † indicates the countries from which the samples of individuals
are collected to study the influence of September 11 on religious behaviour in sub-
section (3.4.2) of this dissertation.
Table C1: Countries by Dominant Islamic Faith
Predominantly Sunni countries
Albania Egypt† Malaysia Saudi Arabia
Algeria Indonesia† Mali Turkey†
Bangladesh Jordan† Morocco†
Burkina Faso Kyrgyzstan Pakistan
Predominantly Shi’ite countries
Azerbaijan Iran† Iraq
Notes: The share of the population adhering to Islam in
these countries higher than 50 percent.
† Countries from which the samples of individuals used in
sub-section (4.4.2) are collected.
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